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Three things are to be helpt in conscience,
Fraud, accident, and things of confidence.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy courts have frequently been characterized as courts of
equity.2 Often this characterization has accompanied unusually relaxed
interpretation or application of a provision of the Bankruptcy Code.3 At
least since Aristotle, the term equity (epieikeia) can connote something like
purposeful interpretation4 or mitigation of otherwise harsh results (mitigatio
1. Attributed to Lord Chancellor Sir Thomas More (1478-1535). See ANTHONY LAUSSAT, JR.,
AN ESSAY ON EQUITY IN PENNSYLVANIA 67 (1826). A more modem formulation might read,
"Three things are to be adjudicated in equity/Fraud, mistake, and breach of fiduciary duty."
2. Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 304 (1939) (noting that bankruptcy courts apply "the
principles and rules of equity jurisprudence"); see, e.g., Canino v. Bleau (In re Canino), 185 BR.
584, 594 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) ("[G]enerally, a failure to comply with bankruptcy rules may be
excused by equitable doctrines."). But see Alan M. Ahart, The Limited Scope of Implied Powers of a
Bankruptcy Judge: A Statutory Court of Bankruptcy, Not a Court of Equity, 79 AM. BANKR. LJ. 1, 1
(2005) ("This Article will show that a bankruptcy judge has... no general equitable power.").
While the Supreme Court has never defined the scope of equity in bankruptcy, it has considered the
interplay between equity and the specifics of the Bankruptcy Code in a number of cases. See, e.g.,
Norwest Bank Worthington v. Ahlers, 485 U.S. 197, 206 (1988) (holding that a bankruptcy court's
equitable powers "must and can only be exercised within the confines of the Bankruptcy Code").
3. See, e.g., James Steven Rogers, Indeterminacy and the Law of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1377, 1377 (2011) ("Squishy. That's been the rap on the law of restitution since before there
even was a law of restitution.").
4. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 133 (David Ross trans., Oxford
World's Classics ed. 1998) (c. 384 B.C.E.) ("The same thing, then, is just and equitable, and while
both are good the equitable is superior. What creates the problem is that the equitable is just, but not
the legally just but a correction of legal justice. The reason is that all law is universal but about
some things it is not possible to make a universal statement which shall be correct .... And this is
the nature of the equitable, a correction of law where it is defective owing to its universality."); see
also Emily Sherwin, Restitution and Equity: An Analysis of the Principle of Unjust Enrichment, 79
TEx. L. REV. 2083, 2084 (2001) ("[U]njust enrichment can be interpreted as a principle of
Aristotelian equity, providing correction when normally sound rules produce unjust results in
particular cases."); Eric G. Zahnd, The Application of Universal Laws to Particular Cases: A
Defense of Equity in Aristotelianism and Anglo-American Law, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 1,
Winter 1996, at 263, 264 ("A full explanation of Aristotle's and Pound's writings demonstrates that
a judge's use of equity is a necessary and stabilizing feature of the application of universal laws to
particular cases. As such, equity does not invoke the mere vicissitudes of a judge's conscience;
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iuris).5  That is not, however, equity's principal meaning when
understanding the powers of courts of equity.6 Courts of equity historically
applied the law of equity and, notwithstanding John Selden's libel-equity is
a roguish thing because its rules vary with the length of the chancellor's
foot'-equity in England was as "lawful" as the common law.' The law of
equity, like the common law, covered a large range of topics-trusts and
estates, injunction, contracts, specific performance, unjust enrichment,
restitution, and disgorgement.' The law of equity was not limited to
particular remedies.'t  Like the common law, equity's remedies
encompassed money damages-but it also included many more."
Importantly, the law of equity was substantive as well as remedial; it
recognized primary rights as well as secondary rights of rectification. 2
rather, equity accounts for the particular facts of any given situation and applies general laws to a
specific case").
5. See J.B. MOYLE, IMPERATORIS IUSTINIANI INsTITUTIONUM: LtBRI QUATrUOR 29 (5th ed.
1912) (identifying a new element in Roman law in the Digest of Justinian's Corpus: aequitas
(equity) as "mitigation of strict law in accordance with a sense of justice"). See generally DANIEL R.
COQUILLETTE, THE ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL HERITAGE: INTRODUCTORY MATERIALS 184, 191-95
(2nd ed. 2004) (describing the classical, canonical, and humanistic origins of equity in England).
The Western medieval tradition drew together both classical aspects of equity. See, e.g., 3 THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA pt. II-11, question 120, arts. 1 & 2 (Fathers of the English
Dominican Province trans., Benzinger 1st complete American ed. 1948) (1274). For contemporary
"naturalized" accounts for equity culminating in restitution, see Mark P. Gergen, What Renders
Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEx. L. REV. 1927, 1930 (2001) ("Under private law there is no obligation
to share one's good fortune with another person .... In this respect the law of Restitution, like
Contract and Tort law, is a matter of corrective justice."); Lionel Smith, Restitution: The Heart of
Corrective Justice, 79 TEx. L. REV. 2115 (2001).
6. See Rogers, supra note 3, at 1387 (discussing confusion created by use of the term equity to
describe both fairness and the phenomenon of the legal system administered by the Courts of
Equity).
7. JOHN SELDEN, TABLE-TALK: BEING THE DISCOURSES OF JOHN SELDEN 54-55 (2nd ed.1696)
("Equity is a Roguish Thing, for Law we have a Measure, know what to trust to, Equity is according
to the Conscience of him that is Chancellor, and as that is larger or narrower, so is Equity. 'Tis.all
one as if they should make the Standard for the Measure, we call a Chancellor's Foot, what an
uncertain Measure would this be? One Chancellor has a long Foot, another a short Foot, a Third an
indifferent Foot: 'Tis the same thing in the Chancellor's Conscience.").
8. See Zahnd, supra note 4, at 264 ("Equity does not vary with the length of the Chancellor's
foot."); see also H. Brent McKnight, How Shall We Then Reason? The Historical Setting of Equity,
45 MERCER L. REV. 919 (1994) (describing the tumultuous pre-English Revolutionary setting in
which Selden made his famed quip). See generally Lawrence B. Solum, Equity and the Rule of Law,
in THE RULE OF LAW: NOMOS XXXVI 120 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994).
9. See Thomas 0. Main, Traditional Equity and Contemporary Procedure, 78 WASH. L. REV.
429,437-52 (2003).
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See Douglas Laycock, How Remedies Became a Field: A History, 27 REV. LmG. 161, 164
The idea of a "law of equity" jars the contemporary ear. When not
thinking of equity as epieikeia or mitigatio iuris, most lawyers, judges, and
academics identify equity with remedies; the tail wagged by the dog of
substantive law. Remedies like injunction and specific performance
comprise the bulk of the leading casebooks on equitable remedies. 3 Equity
as a subset of remedies dominates the contemporary conceptual landscape.
If equity once boasted a substantial substantive content, what was it and
why has it been reduced to remedies? The answer to the first question is
found in the title of the Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust
Enrichment. Unjust (or unjustifiable) enrichment provides the conceptual
core of this body of law. As the converse of tort law, which identifies
unjustified harms to another, unjust enrichment recognizes unjustified
benefits to another, at least to the extent that they come at the claimant's
expense. The answer to the second question-why equity has been reduced
to remedies-is historical and pedagogical. Historically, equity in America
as an independent aspect of civil jurisdiction, often with separate courts,
ceased to exist over the course of a century. Anglo-American law abolished
the writ system and merged courts of law and equity beginning with the
Field Code in 1848 and culminating in Virginia in 2006.4 Pedagogically,
American legal education has, over the course of the twentieth century,
focused on a limited number of substantive fields of law to the exclusion of
unjust enrichment-contributing to a lack of understanding of the law of
equity .15
Notwithstanding the merger of law and equity, and in spite of the long-
standing failure of law schools to teach the law of equity, in the mid-1990's
the American Law Institute appointed Andrew Kull as the reporter for the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (R3RUE). 6 With
seven drafts completed and final approval received at the 2010 meeting of
the American Law Institute, 7 we can expect to see the R3RUE begin to
(2007).
13. See, e.g., DOUG RENDLEMAN & CAPRICE L. ROBERTS, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS
(2011); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2010);
RUSSELL L. WEAVER ET AL., REMEDIES: CASES, PRACTICAL PROBLEMS AND EXERCISES (2010);
EDWARD D. RE & JOSEPH R. RE, REMEDIES: CASES AND MATERIALS (2005).
14. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 171. See generally KENT SINCLAIR, GUIDE TO VIRGINIA
LAW/EQUITY REFORM AND OTHER LANDMARK CHANGES (2006).
15. See Laycock, supra note 12, at 164 (describing evolution of "remedies" from its first
identification with the forms of action in the nineteenth century to its use as a synonym for civil
procedure in the first half of the twentieth century to the modem view of remedies as what a "court
will do to correct or prevent the violation of legal rights that gives rise to liability").
16. See Andrew Kull, Three Restatements of Restitution, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 867,879-80
(2011).
17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT (2011) [hereinafter
R3RUE].
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affect the legal landscape in the near future. It is that impending impact in
bankruptcy that constitutes the burden of this article.
Part II will briefly summarize the substantive law of equity as expressed
in the R3RUE. It will address the substantive core of law of equity that
characterizes the concept of unjust enrichment. Unjust enrichment is
grounded in distinct categories of operative facts, such as: benefits conferred
by mistake or without request, pursuant to a voidable contract, or as a result
of wrongful interference with a claimant's rights. Part III will survey the
remedial aspects of the R3RUE comprising the four so-called proprietary
remedies-constructive trust, equitable lien, subrogation, and the paired set
of rescission and restitution. In turn, Parts IV-VII will focus on each of
these four remedies in greater depth and examine whether and how courts
operating under bankruptcy law have applied them. Part VIII concludes
with some specific observations of how the R3RUE can and should affect
the development of the law of equity in bankruptcy by firmly recognizing a
place for certain of the proprietary remedies.
II. THE LAW OF EQUITY
Tracking the original 1937 Restatement of Restitution, 9 the R3RUE
begins with the comprehensive statement that "[a] person who is unjustly
enriched at the expense of another is subject to liability in restitution. 20 The
breadth of this assertion seems to belie any belief that there is a law of
equity. The phrase "unjustly enriched" could be construed to open the door
to a judge's free-floating moral inquiry into what is fair.2' The comments to
section one of the R3RUE and the following sections make clear that this is
not what unjust enrichment means. "Unjust enrichment" is a term of art. An
18. See Hanoch Dagan, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Why All Involuntary Creditors Should Be
Preferred, 78 AM. BANKR. LJ. 247, 247 (2004) ("After a long period of decline, restitution-the
body of law dealing with benefit-based liability or benefit-based recovery-is finally making a
comeback in the American legal landscape." (footnote omitted)).
19. The full title was the LAW OF RESTITUTION: QUASI-CONTRACTS AND CONSTRUCTIVE
TRUSTS (1937). See generally Andrew Kull, James Barr Ames and the Early Modern History of
Unjust Enrichment, 25 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 297 (2005) [hereinafter Kull, James Barr Ames]
(describing history of the intellectual impetus for this first Restatement).
20. R3RUE§ 1.
21. Kull, James Barr Ames, supra note 19, at 318 ("[T]here were some who feared that the
natural choice for a title would be misunderstood; that if it published a 'Restatement of Unjust
Enrichment,' the American Law Institute would [be] seen as endorsing an open-ended charter of
liability, to be invoked in any case where 'enrichment' and 'injustice' might be thought to
coincide.").
early comment in the R3RUE observes that the "concern of restitution" is
not with unjust enrichment in the broad, moral sense but with the "narrower
set of circumstances giving rise to what might more appropriately be called
unjustified enrichment."22 Unjust enrichment as expressed in the R3RUE is
not the application of the untrammeled conscience of a judge or jury, but
rather the shorthand expression of a finite set of legally cognizable claims.
Claims sounding in unjust enrichment arose historically in both law and
equity.23 One branch of restitution for unjust enrichment can be traced to
claims at law called quasi-contract and the common counts.24 The other
principal antecedent of claims for unjust enrichment can be found in the
remedies fashioned by courts of equity.25 As described below, however, the
challenges of applying the remedies for unjust enrichment in bankruptcy
arise from the equitable side of the field, not the legal.26
Persons are regularly enriched by many activities that do not render
retention unjust. For example, some years ago I lived next door to a
wonderful percussionist and was greatly enriched by listening to him play a
variety of instruments. Retention of that enrichment without payment was
not unjust. What makes the retention of certain benefits unjust is the lack of
a recognized legal basis. "To be the subject of a claim in restitution, the
benefit conferred must be something in which the claimant has a legally
protected interest, and it must be acquired or retained in a manner that the
law regards as unjustified."27  Thus, it is generally the case that benefits
wrongfully obtained are unjustly retained. Gains obtained by fraud or
duress are obvious examples. Yet, even when receipt of benefits is not
wrongful, retention of certain benefits non-consensually received may be
unjust. Benefits received by mistake are the paradigmatic example.
Listening to music over the fence was neither wrongful nor unjust.
Section two of the R3RUE describes these limiting principles in broad
brush: "[t]he fact that a recipient has obtained a benefit without paying for it
does not of itself establish that the recipient has been unjustly enriched."28
For example, "[a] valid contract defines the obligations of the parties as to
22. R3RUE § I cmt. b.
23. Id. § 4 cmt. b.
24. See Peter Birks, Restitution for Wrongs, in UNJUST ENRICHMENT: THE COMPARATIVE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 171, 177-91 (Eltjo J.H. Schrage ed., 1995).
25. Id.
26. See infra Part III.
27. R3RUE § 2 cmt. b. The same comment goes on to observe that "the fact that we derive
advantage from the efforts and expenditures of others is not 'unjust enrichment' but one of the
advantages of civilization." Indeed, such a voluntary sharing of benefits is one of the very means by
which humanity reaches its end or purpose. See C. Scott Pryor, Principled Pluralism and Contract
Remedies, 40 MCGEORGE L. REv. 723, 742-43 (2009).
28. R3RUE § 2(1).
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matters within its scope, displacing to that extent any inquiry into unjust
enrichment."2 9  Deferring to recognized forms of exchange, restitution
recognizes the superiority of contract's ex ante value-setting function over a
court's reexamination efforts even if, in retrospect, the values exchanged are
substantially disproportionate."° Similarly, a claim in unjust enrichment
generally cannot be used to foist an exchange on an unwilling party.3 But
for certain emergencies, foregoing an opportunity to contract will defeat a
claim of unjust enrichment.
Chapters 2-6 of the R3RUE classify the factual circumstances or
predicates that have been recognized in American common law as
amounting to unjustified enrichment.32 Thus, Chapter 2 (sections 5-19)
addresses situations where the claimant confers a benefit involuntarily, e.g.,
by mistake,33 as a result of fraud,34 duress,35 or the exercise of undue
influence,36 while incapacitated,37 or by one without of authority.38 Chapter
3 (sections 20-30) deals with unrequested benefits obtained without a prior
agreement to pay, e.g., protecting another's life, health,
39 or property; 40
performing the duties of another person; 4' performing a joint obligation42
(and sometimes even performing another's independent obligation 43); and
29. See id. § 2(2). So too, a gift: "A valid gift is not a source of unjust enrichment ...." Id. § 2
cmt. b.
30. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 79 (1981) ("If the requirement of
consideration is met, there is no additional requirement of... (b) equivalence in the values
exchanged....").
31. See R3RUE § 2(4) ("Liability in restitution may not subject an innocent recipient to a forced
exchange: in other words, an obligation to pay for a benefit that the recipient should have been free
to refuse.").
32. See id. at chs. 2-6.
33. See R3RUE § 5 ("Invalidating Mistake"); see infra Appendix A. Sections 6-12 of the
R3RUE lay out with specificity the methods of invalidating mistakes that are regularly recognized
by the courts.
34. See R3RUE § 13 ("Fraud and Misrepresentation"); see infra Appendix A.
35. See R3RUE § 14 ("Duress"); see infra Appendix A.
36. See R3RUE § 15 ("Undue Influence"); see infra Appendix A.
37. See R3RUE § 16 ("Incapacity of Transferor"); see infra Appendix A.
38. See R3RUE § 17 ("Lack of Authority"); see infra Appendix A.
39. See R3RUE § 20 ("Protection of Another's Life or Health"); see infra Appendix A.
40. See R3RUE § 21 ("Protection of Another's Property"); see infra Appendix A.
41. See R3RUE § 22 ("Performance of Another's Duty"); see infra Appendix A.
42. See R3RUE § 23 ("Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and Contribution)"); see
infra Appendix A.
43. See R3RUE § 24 ("Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable Subrogation)");
see infra Appendix A.
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providing property or services as part of a cohabiting relationship." In
Chapter 4 (sections 31-39), the R3RUE deals with the restoration of benefits
conferred pursuant to a voidable contract, e.g., as a result of an agreement's
indefiniteness or the parties' failure to comply with the Statute of Frauds;45
when a contract is illegal or otherwise violates public policy; 6 where the
recipient of contract benefits is incompetent; 47 where a contract has been
discharged because of mistake or impracticability; a or where a material
breacher has provided contract benefits to the other party.49 Chapter 5
(sections 40-45) addresses cases where one party has received benefits
through wrongful interference with the rights of the claimant, e.g., by
trespass, 51 misappropriation,5 infringement,52 breach of fiduciary duty,53 or
homicide. Finally, the R3RUE concludes its description of examples of
unjustified enrichment with a set of residual cases in Chapter 6 (sections 46-
48). 5 The organizing rubrics animating the chapters of the R3RUE are to
some extent arbitrary.56 Yet the principles and rules of the R3RUE provide a
far more serviceable result than the first Restatement of Restitution. In large
part, it is because of the R3RUE's clarity that it can be expected to have an
impact on the jurisprudence of bankruptcy courts.
III. EQUITY'S PROPRIETARY REMEDIES
The remedial provisions of the R3RUE compose Chapter 7.57
Prominent among them are the quartet of constructive trusts,58 equitable
liens ,5 subrogation, and the paired set of rescission and restitution 6 - what
44. See R3RUE § 28 ("Unmarried Cohabitants"); see infra Appendix A.
45. See R3RUE § 31 ("Unenforceability"); see infra Appendix A.
46. See R3RUE § 32 ("Illegality"); see infra Appendix A.
47. See R3RUE § 33 ("Incapacity of Recipient"); see infra Appendix A.
48. See R3RUE § 34 ("Mistake or Supervening Change of Circumstances"); see infra Appendix
A.
49. See R3RUE § 36 ("Restitution to a Party in Default"); see infra Appendix A.
50. See R3RUE § 40 ("Trespass, Conversion, and Comparable Wrongs"); see infra Appendix A.
51. See R3RUE § 41 ("Misappropriation of Financial Assets"); see infra Appendix A.
52. See R3RUE § 42 ("Interference with Intellectual Property and Similar Rights"); see infra
Appendix A.
53. See R3RUE § 43 ("Fiduciary or Confidential Relation"); see infra Appendix A.
54. See R3RUE §§ 45-46.
55. See id. §§ 46-48.
56. See, e.g., Chaim Saiman, Restating Restitution: A Case of Contemporary Common Law
Conceptualism, 52 VILL. L. REV. 487 (2007).
57. See R3RUE ch. 7.
58. See R3RUE § 55 ("Constructive Trust"); see infra Appendix A. See infra Part IV.
59. See R3RUE § 56 ("Equitable Lien"); see infra Appendix A. See infra Part V.
60. See R3RUE § 57 ("Subrogation as a Remedy"); see infra Appendix A. See infra Part VI.
61. See R3RUE § 54 ("Rescission and Restitution"); see infra Appendix A. See infra Part VII.
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the R3RUE refers to collectively as rights to "restitution via rights in
identifiable property. 62  More simply, each of these can be called
proprietary remedies. Of additional significance in the event of insolvency
is section 60 of the R3RUE, 63 which articulates a rule of priority to resolve
conflicts between the claimant to a proprietary remedy and a creditor who
holds an unsecured claim.' And of significance in all cases are the tracing
rules of sections 58 and 59 of the R3RUE, as well as the defenses described
in Chapter 8.65
More than the substantive bases of unjust enrichment, the proprietary
remedies play a significant role in bankruptcy.66 If recognized in an
insolvency proceeding, proprietary remedies effectively remove property
from the estate and thus reduce what is available for other creditors.67 Two
leading policies typical of all forms of insolvency law may thus appear to
conflict. On the one hand, the principle of pari passu requires that all
similarly-situated creditors of a debtor be accorded equal treatment.68 On the
other, the nature of property prohibits satisfaction of the claims of creditors
with property belonging to someone other than the debtor.69 For simplicity,
this can be characterized as the principle of property.
62. R3RUE § 54 cmt. a.
63. Id. § 60 ("Priority"); see infra Appendix A.
64. R3RUE § 60.
65. See, e.g., id. § 62 ("No Unjust Enrichment"); id. § 63 ("Unclean Hands"); id. § 64 ("Passing
On"); id. § 65 ("Change of Position"); id. § 66 ("Bona Fide Purchaser"); id. § 67 ("Bona Fide
Payee"); id. § 70 ("Laches"). These defenses to claims for restitution are traditionally cast as
affirmative defenses, but they could equally as well be understood to traverse an element of
claimant's substantive claim.
66. See generally Anthony Duggan, Proprietary Remedies in Insolvency: A Comparison of the
Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment with English and Commonwealth Law, 68
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1229 (2011) (discussing the role of proprietary remedies in bankruptcy).
67. Id.
68. See Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property
and Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305, 309 (1999) ("The first of these principles, which I call the
'pari passu principle,' provides that unsecured creditors rank equally with each other in right to
payment, regardless of the temporal order in which they extend credit ...."). See also Pepper v.
Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 306 (1939) ("The mere fact that an officer, director, or stockholder has a claim
against his bankrupt corporation or that he has reduced that claim to judgment does not mean that the
bankruptcy court must accord it pari passu treatment with the claims of other creditors. Its
disallowance or subordination may be necessitated by certain cardinal principles of equity
jurisprudence.").
69. See Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 135-36 (1962) ("The Bankruptcy Act
simply does not authorize a trustee to distribute other people's property among a bankrupt's
creditors." (footnote omitted)).
What constitutes a claim is rarely at issue in matters involving unjust
enrichment; bankruptcy courts have little difficulty in allowing claims that
are described under the substantive rules of the .R3RUE.7° But, what
constitutes "property of another" has proved problematic.7 The fuzzy edge
of what constitutes property, particularly the effects of the quartet of
proprietary remedies, has troubled American bankruptcy courts.
Anthony Duggan aptly characterizes the source of the "property
problem" when he observes that the distinction between personal and
proprietary rights in a common law system "is not a straightforward exercise
because equity blurs the boundaries."72 With regard to the principle of pari
passu, the treatment of claims arising under the rubrics of contract and tort
has presented some significant challenges." With regard to the principle of
property, 7" courts have been careful to ensure that creditors' claims are not
satisfied with property to which the debtor does not hold legal title.75 Yet,
these challenges pale in comparison to the conceptual variations and outright
contradictions that courts express when addressing questions of equitable
title.76 Whether courts choose to follow or reject the R3RUE, its relevant
remedial sections offer a resource to correct misstatements of the law,77 and,
what's more, provide an analytic framework by which to evaluate the
competing principles of insolvency law.
IV. CONSTRUCTIVE TRUST
A. From Equity
The most potent of the proprietary remedies is the constructive trust.78
As with all proprietary remedies, constructive trust "supplement[s] the
70. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54. See also the broad definition of "claim" in the
Bankruptcy Code. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).
71. See Duggan, supra note 66, at 1232.
72. Id.
73. See, e.g., Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992) (concluding that assets held in ERISA-
qualified pension plan were not property of the estate).
74. A debtor's bankruptcy estate is composed of the debtor's legal and equitable interests in
property as of the commencement of the case. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006). The estate may also be
enhanced by the avoidance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. §§ 544-48. These provisions
permit the avoidance of certain pre-bankruptcy transfers that effectively reduce the amount available
for distribution to unsecured creditors. Broadly speaking, these powers go beyond the common law
to augment the legal and equitable interests of the debtor that existed at the filing of bankruptcy.
75. See supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
76. See Duggan, supra note 66, at 1251, 1267 (discussing court decisions concerning equitable
title).
77. See infra text accompanying notes 93-114.
78. See discussion supra Part I1I.
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personal liability of the defendant with significant rights in rem."79 In two
parts, section 55 of the R3RUE provides that:
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title
to identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation
of the claimant's rights, the defendant may be declared a
constructive trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, of the property
in question and its traceable product.
(2) The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the
constructive trust property to the claimant, on such conditions as the
court may direct."
Application of the remedy of constructive trust is triggered only when
one of the substantive bases of unjust enrichment described in Part I has
been established: the first step is to establish that the recipient has been
unjustly enriched by the acquisition of specific property, the test of unjust
enrichment being found in the applicable rules of Chapters 2-6."'
Notwithstanding broad judicial language,82 the decision to impose a
constructive trust on property is not the application of a court's moral
judgment.83 The legal rights for which the remedy of constructive trust may
be appropriate are limited to those cases of unjustified enrichment
recognized by the law, whether common law or equity or both. 4
The substantive predicate of unjust enrichment is only one of two
required for the remedy of constructive trust. The second predicate concerns
the nature of the unjust enrichment: it must entail the acquisition of title to
identifiable property.5 Simply enhancing the value of another's assets is
79. R3RUE pt. III, ch. 7, Introductory Note (2011).
80. R3RUE § 55.
81. Id. § 55 cmt. a ("The first step is to establish that the defendant is liable in restitution by one
of the substantive provisions of this Restatement. The second is to show that the transaction that is
the source of the liability is one in which the defendant acquired specifically identifiable property. If
the property the claimant seeks to recover via constructive trust is a substitute for the property
originally acquired by the defendant, its continued identification depends on the tracing rules of §§
58 and 59.").
82. See, e.g., Beatty v. Guggenheim Exploration Co., 122 N.E. 378, 380 (N.Y. 1919),
superseded by statute, as stated in Israel v. Chabra, 906 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 2009).
83. R3RUE § 1 cmt. b ("[Tihe law of restitution is very far from imposing liability for every
instance of what might plausibly be called unjust enrichment.").
84. See id. § 4 ("Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both"); see infra Appendix A.
85. See id. § 55 cmt. f ("Assuming that the defendant is indeed liable to the claimant on a
restitution theory, constructive trust is not an available remedy unless the transaction that gives rise
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insufficient to ground a claim in constructive trust (although it may be
enough for an equitable lien 6). Even proof of a causal relationship between
enriching actions and increased value of a specific item of defendant's
property is insufficient; one who seeks a constructive trust must prove that
the defendant acquired legal title to the identified asset as a result of the
unjust enrichment.87
Demonstrating the presence of unjust enrichment and acquisition of title
to identifiable property defines the universe of substantive predicates for
constructive trust in the two-party scenario."8 But how should the law
resolve the implications of the presence of a third party, e.g., unsecured
creditors of an insolvent defendant? When, if ever, should the unjust
enrichment claimant be entitled to assert constructive trust in identifiable
property against a debtor's other creditors? While the second element of the
claim-the debtor's acquisition of title to identifiable property -remains the
same, the claimant must additionally establish that the debtor's creditors will
be unjustly enriched at the claimant's expense in order to obtain a
constructive. 9 In short, the debtor should not be able to rob Peter to pay
Paul."
to liability is one in which the defendant acquires ownership of the trust property."); see also id. § 55
illus. 14 ("Son works in Father's business at a nominal salary, relying on Father's oral promise that
on Father's 75th birthday (still several years distant) he will transfer to Son a 50% share in the
business. On reaching the age of 75, Father repudiates his promise, which is unenforceable under
the Statute of Frauds. Son has a claim in restitution to recover the amount, if any, by which the
market value of his services exceeds the salary he has received (§ 31). Son would prefer that the
court declare Father a constructive trustee for his benefit of a 50 percent interest in the business. The
remedy is unavailable because the transaction by which Father was unjustly enriched was not the
source of Father's title to identifiable property.").
86. See infra text accompanying notes 175-85.
87. See R3RUE § 55 illus. 15. Illustration 15 presents the same facts as Illustration 14, except
that the court finds that the value of particular assets in Father's business has been significantly
enhanced by Son's efforts. Id. While this relationship of cause and effect does not entitle Son to
claim a share of ownership via constructive trust, it satisfies the requirements of section 56 R3RUE
for the remedy of equitable lien. Id. The court might therefore grant Son an equitable lien on the
assets in question, to secure Son's unjust enrichment claim against Father. Id.; see also supra text
accompanying note 85.
88. See supra notes 85-87.
89. See R3RUE § 55 cmt. d.
90. Id. ("Priority in this three-way contest may be explained without reference to formal notions
of title. Even if A's suit for restitution is formally asserted against B as defendant, A's implicit
claim-to justify in equitable terms the remedy of constructive trust-is that B's unsecured creditor
C will be unjustly enriched, at A's expense, if B's debt to C is satisfied from assets that B obtained
from A by fraud. The intuitive objection is that a debtor should not be allowed to rob Peter to pay
Paul.").
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B. Into Bankruptcy
The oft-repeated refrain that bankruptcy courts are not roving
commissions to do equity9' has obscured what it is that bankruptcy courts
are to do with the law of equity. Confusion reigns among equity as
epieikeia, equity as mitigatio iuris, equity as the basis of substantive rights,
and equity as the source of certain remedies.92 Nowhere is this confusion
better demonstrated than in the treatment of constructive trust in bankruptcy.
1. Recognition
The relationship in bankruptcy between the proprietary remedy of
constructive trust and the claims of general creditors has been bubbling at
the surface since the 1994 decision in In re Omegas Group, Inc.93 The Sixth
Circuit concluded that with few exceptions a bankruptcy court could not
impose a constructive trust on assets of the bankruptcy estate.94 Unless there
had been a final judgment imposing a constructive trust before the
bankruptcy filing, virtually no facts would warrant the imposition of one
afterward.95 The court asserted that a constructive trust is "anathema" to
bankruptcy because it violates the principle of pari passu.9  That a
proprietary remedy might vindicate the principle of property received short
shrift because, according to the court, "[a] constructive trust is a legal
fiction, a common-law remedy in equity that may only exist by the grace of
judicial action."97  The court justified its failure to substantiate this
conclusion with only cursory reference to the law of Kentucky with the
91. See, e.g., Jacobsen v. Moser (In re Jacobsen), 609 F.3d 647, 661 (5th Cir. 2010); see also
Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 374-75 (2007) (analyzing limited scope of
equitable power under the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2006)).
92. See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
93. XL/Datacomp, Inc. v. Wilson (In re Omegas Grp., Inc.), 16 F.3d 1443 (6th Cir. 1994).
94. Id. at 1452.
95. Id. at 1449.
Unless a court has already impressed a constructive trust upon certain assets or a
legislature has created a specific statutory right to have particular kinds of funds held as if
in trust, the claimant cannot properly represent to the bankruptcy court that he was, at the
time of the commencement of the case, a beneficiary of a constructive trust held by the
debtor.
Id. (footnote omitted).
96. Id. at 1452 ("Constructive trusts are anathema to the equities of bankruptcy since they take
from the estate, and thus directly from competing creditors, not from the offending debtor.").
97. Id. at 1449.
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remarkable comment that "just because something is so under state law does
not necessarily make it so under the Bankruptcy Code."98
Andrew Kull responded four years later with a lengthy article attacking
the Omegas decision.99 Rather than reviewing Kull's critique, this article
will focus on how the facts and law reported in Omegas would be analyzed
under the R3RUE. The first question is whether Omegas, the debtor, was
unjustly enriched at the expense of claimant Datacomp. In other words, do
the facts identified by the court support any of the substantive bases for
unjust enrichment described in the R3RUE? According to the Sixth
Circuit's version of the facts, Datacomp and the debtor Omegas entered into
an arrangement to finance Omegas's purchase of IBM computers in
violation of Omegas's (and Datacomp's) existing contracts with IBM.'00
Under their agreement, Datacomp ordered computers from Omegas and
prepaid for them. 1 However, it never received the computers because
Omegas subsequently cancelled its orders from IBM while keeping
Datacomp's payments, and then filed bankruptcy. 2 Datacomp brought an
adversary action asserting that Omegas had obtained payment for the
computers from Datacomp by fraud and asking the court to impose a
constructive trust on the amounts so paid. 3
Section 13 of the R3RUE states that "[a] transfer induced by fraud ... is
subject to rescission."'" Indeed, contract law has long provided that a
defrauded party has the power to avoid a contract induced by fraud.0 5 The
facts found by the bankruptcy court, however, do not clearly indicate fraud
98. Id. at 1450. The court's failure to cite the leading Supreme Court decision is telling. See
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) ("Property interests are created and defined by state
law. Unless some federal interest requires a different result, there is no reason why such interests
should be analyzed differently simply because an interested party is involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding.").
99. Andrew Kull, Restitution in Bankruptcy: Reclamation and Constructive Trust, 72 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 265 (1998). Kull was also the Reporter for the R3RUE. But see Rogers, supra note 3,
at 1404-05 (criticizing Kull's conclusions with respect to the effect of tracing rules extending
priority of a proprietary claimant to proceeds).
100. Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1445-46. Omegas had reached its credit limit with IBM's financing arm
and was in danger of financial collapse. Id. at 1445. Rather than purchasing directly from IBM as it
ordinarily had done, Datacomp agreed not only to buy IBM computers from Omegas but to pay for
them in advance of delivery. Id. at 1446. Fortified with the prepayments from Datacomp, Omegas
was to pay down its line of credit with IBM and continue in business. Id. Of course, it ultimately
did neither.
101. Id. at 1446.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. SeeR3RUE§ 13 (2011).
105. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 164 (1981) ("When a Misrepresentation
Makes a Contract Voidable: I) If a party's manifestation of assent is induced by either a fraudulent
or a material misrepresentation by the other party upon which the recipient is justified in relying, the
contract is voidable by the recipient.").
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by Omegas; both parties went in with their eyes wide open.' °6 Additionally,
the extensive performance under the contract substantially weakens any
claim for rescission and restitution; by the time of bankruptcy it was too late
to unscramble the egg.'17 In brief, the facts in Omegas would not have
warranted rescission by Datacomp even had Omegas never filed bankruptcy.
However, even if Omegas defrauded Datacomp, the nature of
Datacomp's performance-payment of money to Omegas-is not the sort
for which a proprietary remedy like constructive trust is appropriate.
Constructive trust is a remedy for unjust enrichment by which the defendant
acquires "legal title to specifically identifiable property,""' not one by which
it receives fungible funds.0 9 In addition, the majority in Omegas ignored the
tracing issues raised by the commingling of Datacomp's payments with
other funds in Omegas bank account."0 Given the cash-poor nature of most
debtors immediately before bankruptcy, the lowest intermediate balance in
Omegas bank account would likely have been zero. Finally, while the court
mentions the doctrine of unclean hands,"' it fails to explain that the law of
equity consistently bars a claimant from a proprietary remedy when it too
engaged in inequitable conduct."' The facts in Omegas never warranted a
constructive trust for Datacomp.
In its haste to expunge constructive trust from bankruptcy, the Sixth
Circuit failed to take seriously the law of equity. That law, summarized in
the R3RUE, suggests that Omegas was not unjustly enriched at Datacomp's
106. Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1446. On the one hand, the trial court found that "Datacomp entered
into the agreement... as 'in a sense a joint venture' .... " Id. On the other, Omegas continued to
invoice Datacomp for computers even after it had cancelled the corresponding orders from IBM. Id.
The bankruptcy court applied a constructive trust only to payments received by Omegas after
cancellation-even though that time was well after the parties entered into their contract. Id.
107. See infra text accompanying notes 330-52.
108. See R3RUE § 55 cmt. a.
109. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
110. See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1454 (Guy, J., concurring) ("The trustee emphasizes that...
Omegas commingled Datacomp's money with over $1,600,000 of money it received from other
sources."). Section 59 of the R3RUE provides for the typical lowest intermediate balance test
tracing rule in such a situation. R3RUE § 59 ("Tracing into or Through a Commingled Fund"); see
infra Appendix A. The First Circuit has applied this rule to deny application of a constructive trust
where unjustly obtained funds had been completely dissipated. See Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v.
Universal Ins. Co., 838 F.2d 612 (1st Cir. 1988).
111. See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1448 ("Omegas also argues that the fishy nature of Datacomp's
attempt to keep getting IBM computers at a favorable rate through Omegas's still-valid IR
agreement renders Datacomp's hands 'unclean,' thus preventing it from seeking the equitable
remedy of constructive trust.").
112. See R3RUE § 63 ("Equitable Disqualification (Unclean Hands)"); see infra Appendix A.
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expense and that, even if it were, neither the right of rescission nor the
remedy of constructive trust was warranted. Subsequent decisions by the
Sixth Circuit"' and lower courts'14 in the Sixth Circuit suggest a quiet stand-
down from the broad assertion in Omegas that there can be no constructive
trusts in bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the Omegas opinion privileges the
principle of pari passu at the expense of the principle of property.
Other circuit courts have been more lenient in permitting application of
constructive trust in bankruptcy. Applying New Jersey law, the Second
Circuit blessed the application of a constructive trust on a debtor's inventory
of air conditioners stored in New Jersey in violation of its security
agreement.' In contrast with the opinion in Omegas that would have
denied a constructive trust even for fraud," 6 Howard's Appliance found
sufficient grounds for constructive trust upon little more than breach of
contract." 7 The R3RUE would not countenance a proprietary remedy on the
facts of Howard's Appliance."' Without a valid substantive claim of unjust
enrichment, there is no predicate for a constructive trust. Fifteen years later
the Second Circuit cut back on the over-breadth of Howard's Appliance in
113. See, e.g., Poss v. Morris (In re Morris), 260 F.3d 654 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding relief from
automatic stay appropriate to permit existing state court action to determine whether claimant had
enforceable claim from conveyance of property pursuant to settlement agreement to proceed tojudgment with substantive references to relevant Ohio law of unjust enrichment); Kitchen v. Boyd
(In re Newpower), 233 F.3d 922 (6th Cir. 2000) (determining bankruptcy court erred by holding that
embezzled funds were property of the bankruptcy estate but was correct to reject application of
constructive trust to their proceeds); McCafferty v. McCafferty (In re McCafferty), 96 F.3d 192 (6th
Cir. 1996) (holding wife's interest in husband's award by state court was a constructive trust and not
a debt dischargeable in husband's bankruptcy).
114. See, e.g., SCS Gen. Contractors, Inc. v Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., (In re Barnhill's Buffet,
Inc.), 421 B.R. 602, No. 07-08948, 2009 Bankr. LEXIS 4335 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2009); Whitmore
Lake Pub. Schs. v. CMC Telecom, Inc. (In re CMC Telecom, Inc.), 383 B.R. 52 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
2008); Corzin v. Decker, Vonau, Sybert & Lackey, Co. (In re Simms Constr. Servs. Co.), 311 B.R.
479 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2004).
115. Sanyo Elec., Inc. v. Howard's Appliance Corp. (In re Howard's Appliance Corp.), 874 F.2d
88 (2d Cir. 1989).
116. See Omegas, 16 F.3d at 1451 ("We think that § 541(d) simply does not permit a claimant in
the position of Datacomp to persuade the bankruptcy court to impose the remedy of constructive
trust for alleged fraud committed against it by the debtor .... ").
117. See Howard's Appliance Corp.,874 F.2d at 94 ("Howard must have known that, under the
terms of the security agreement, it was obligated to keep its Sanyo merchandise at its Nassau County
location, and that by storing its inventory in New Jersey, it would frustrate Sanyo's interest in those
goods."). The debtor's relocation of its inventory from New York to New Jersey caused perfection
of Sanyo's security interest to lapse under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code as it then
existed. See id. at 91 n.3. Today under revised Article 9, with respect to a corporate debtor, Sanyo's
security interest would attach and remain perfected regardless of the location of the inventory. See
U.C.C. §§ 9-301,9-307 (2010).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 33-54 (identifying cases of unjust enrichment) and 338-
40 (observing that application of a proprietary remedy is inappropriate where parties have
voluntarily entered into subsisting contracts).
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First Central Financial."9 First Central Financial involved a breach of an
agreement for the allocation of tax refunds between a parent and subsidiary
corporation. °20 Though the court correctly observed that "a constructive trust
is an equitable remedy intended to be 'fraud-rectifying' rather than 'intent-
'"121enforcing, it went on to comment in dicta that the principle of pari passu
provided an additional reason not to find a constructive trust in a bankruptcy
proceeding.122
The Third and Fourth Circuits have applied the law of equity in a
straightforward way to recognize the constructive trust remedy when
founded on an instance of unjust enrichment. In Columbia Gas,23 the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission required the debtor to collect
refunds from gas suppliers and rebate them to customers,12 as well as to
collect research surcharges from customers and turn them over to a federally
designated non-profit entity that researched production and transportation of
natural gas.'25 Columbia Gas was a mere conduit. Even the Sixth Circuit
would probably have held that the debtor had no interest in these funds. 2 6 In
any event, the Third Circuit held that both were excluded from the
bankruptcy estate. 127 It then applied the lowest intermediate balance test 2 to
119. Superintendent of Ins. for N.Y. v. Ochs (In re First Cent. Fin. Corp.), 377 F.3d 209 (2d Cir.
2004).
120. Id. at 211 ("FCFC is the parent corporation of FCIC, a New York insurance company. In
the 1980s, the two companies executed a tax allocation agreement ... which prescribed how tax
charges and refunds were to be apportioned between FCFC and FCIC.").
121. Id. at 216 (quoting Bankers Sec. Life Ins. Soc'y v. Shakerdge, 49 N.Y.2d 939, 940 (N.Y.
1980)).
122. Id. at 217 ("The tension between constructive trust law and bankruptcy law is another reason
to proceed with caution.... [O]ur obligation to apply New York constructive trust law does not
diminish the need to 'act very cautiously' to minimize conflict with the goals of the Bankruptcy
Code." (citations omitted)).
123. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. Columbia Gas Sys. Inc. (In re Columbia Gas Sys.
Inc.), 997 F.2d 1039 (3d Cir. 1993).
124. Id. at 1053 ("Pursuant to Order 528, five upstream pipelines that supplied gas to Columbia
filed new rate schedules which allocated $134 million less in buyout or buydown costs to Columbia
than under the purchase deficiency method. Columbia, in turn, filed tariff provisions with FERC to
flow through these refunds to its downstream customers. These refunds, together with
approximately $26 million in refunds arising from other overcharges for gas and transportation
services, comprise the customer refunds that Columbia seeks to exclude from its bankruptcy estate
and pay to its customers.").
125. Id. ("GRI is financed predominantly through FERC-approved surcharges on gas delivered
through regulated pipelines. Pursuant to this regulatory mechanism, each pipeline, including
Columbia, collects a separately identified charge from its customers and then remits this money to
GRI within fifteen days.").
126. See supra note 95.
127. Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d at 1062 ("[W]e hold that the customer refunds already received and
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trace the amount of funds held in constructive trust and limit recovery by the
putative beneficiaries.'29 Conversely, collection of unpaid amounts owed by
Columbia to its suppliers, even though ultimately paid by Columbia's
customers, was not enhanced by an administrative order and was thus purely
contractual and not entitled to a constructive trust. 3 ' In Mid Atlantic
Supply, 3' the Fourth Circuit applied the "mere conduit" reasoning to a check
jointly payable to a subcontractor and supplier for the purchase of
materials."3 The subcontractor would be unjustly enriched by mistake,
according to the court, if it were allowed to retain the check. Sections 7133
and 8' of the R3RUE support this conclusion. Under the circumstances of
the parties' agreement, retention of possession of the check by the
subcontractor would be a mistake because an unintended payee would end
up with the money.'35 And constructive trust was an appropriate remedy for
the unjust enrichment that would have resulted from such a mistake.36
The Fifth,37 Seventh, 38 Ninth,'39 and Eleventh"4 Circuits have also
recognized that claims based on unjust enrichment can be remedied by
those to be received are excluded from Columbia's bankruptcy estate .... The argument for the
GRI surcharges being held in trust is even stronger than the argument for the customer
refunds ....").
128. See id. at 1060.
129. Columbia Gas, 997 F.2d. at 1064 ("When Columbia filed for bankruptcy, the $3.3 million in
its general account was insufficient to satisfy its pre-petition obligations to its customers and GRI.
The bankruptcy court found that this amount represents the lowest intermediate balance in the
general account, and no party has challenged this finding as clearly erroneous. Therefore, Columbia
may distribute only the $3.3 million on a pro rata basis to its customers and GRI to satisfy its pre-
petition obligations. The remainder of its pre-petition obligations to its customers and GRI will be
unsecured debt.").
130. Id. at 1063 ("The obligations owed to upstream pipelines clearly are debts. Columbia owes
the upstream pipelines money for goods and services they have provided to Columbia. Although
Columbia's customers pay the charges of the upstream suppliers dollar-for-dollar through
Columbia's rates,. .. Columbia does not act as a conduit or a collecting agent for the upstream
suppliers. The upstream pipelines are in the same position as every other unsecured creditor.").
131. Mid-Atlantic Supply, Inc. v. Three Rivers Aluminum Co. (In re Mid Atlantic Supply Co.),
790 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1986).
132. Id. at 1127 ("The check in this case, though made payable jointly to Mid-Atlantic and
TRACO, was thus intended as a payment to TRACO by Lawson for the windows .... The district
court correctly found on these facts that there was a constructive trust in favor of TRACO under the
law of Virginia, that equitable title and right of possession in the check and its proceeds (subject to
the exception later noted) belonged to TRACO, and that there was accordingly a constructive trust in
favor of TRACO ....").
133. R3RUE § 7 ("Mistaken Performance of Another's Obligation"); see infra Appendix A.
134. R3RUE § 8 ("Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien"); see infra Appendix A.
135. See R3RUE § 6 cmt. b ("A mistaken payor has a claim in restitution when money is
mistakenly transferred to someone other than the intended recipient.").
136. See supra text accompanying note 81. The claimant would have been able to assert a
proprietary claim as to the traceable proceeds of the check had the subcontractor succeeded in
negotiating it. R3RUE § 50 ("Innocent Recipient"); see infra Appendix A.
137. See Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1985)
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imposition of a constructive trust in bankruptcy. But for the decision of the
Sixth Circuit in Omegas, bankruptcy courts have been authorized to impose
a constructive trust when appropriate for claims founded on unjust
enrichment. The cautionary language employed by some courts is
unnecessary; the principle of property, properly cabined by the limiting rules
of the R3RUE, is not contrary to the principle of pari passu. A claimant's
interest in property, whether legal or equitable, can be preserved and should
not be taken to satisfy the claims of others.
2. Avoidance
Regardless of a claimant's success in obtaining a constructive trust in
bankruptcy, the benefits will be short lived if the trustee has the power to
avoid it. Section 544 of the Bankruptcy Code provides distinct powers to
avoid certain interests in both personal property and real estate.14' To the
extent that the avoidance powers ultimately rest on state common law, the
R3RUE's restatement of that law will be significant. To the extent that
statutes reflect the relevant state or federal law, the R3RUE's effect will be
marginal.4
(recognizing fraud as a substantive basis of unjust enrichment and constructive trust as a remedy, but
finding no basis for constructive trust on facts of case).
138. See Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming imposition of constructive
trust on parcel of real estate on account of debtor's fraud but holding that it was avoidable by trustee
under 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006) of the Bankruptcy Code); see infra note 149.
139. See Mitsui Mfrs. Bank v. Unicorn Computer Corp. (In re Unicorn Computer Corp.), 13 F.3d
321 (9th Cir. 1994) (recognizing mistake as a substantive basis of unjust enrichment and
constructive trust as remedy).
140. See City Nat'l Bank of Miami v. Gen. Coffee Corp. (In re Gen. Coffee Corp.), 828 F.2d 699
(11 th Cir. 1987) (recognizing fraud as substantive basis of unjust enrichment and constructive trust
as remedy).
141. See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544 (2006) ("Trustee as lien creditor and as successor to
certain creditors and purchasers: (a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and
without regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers of, or may
avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is voidable
by-(l) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case, and
that obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a
creditor on a simple contract could have obtained such a judicial lien, whether or not such a creditor
exists; (2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the commencement of the case,
and obtains, at such time and with respect to such credit, an execution against the debtor that is
returned unsatisfied at such time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or (3) a bona fide purchaser
of real property, other than fixtures, from the debtor, against whom applicable law permits such
transfer to be perfected, that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such
transfer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a purchaser exists.").
142. See R3RUE § 60 cmt. a ("Common-law priorities in insolvency may be altered by statute-
In short, § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the
bankruptcy trustee stands in the shoes of a judicial lien creditor as of the
commencement of the case. While section 9-317 of the U.C.C. provides a
rule that addresses the priority of judicial lien creditors with respect to
personal property, it does so only with respect to a competitor who holds a
security interest, not a claimant entitled to a proprietary remedy. 143 But for
the R3RUE, resolution of a competition between holders of a proprietary
remedy and judicial lien creditors could only be found in the vagaries of
state execution law. Tracking the majority of cases decided under execution
statutes and the common law, section 60(1) of the R3RUE makes it clear
that one who holds "a right to restitution from identifiable property [in the
hands of a recipient] is superior to the competing rights of a creditor of the
recipient who is not a ... purchaser."' 14 A creditor, even one who has levied
and obtained a judicial lien on some item of personal property, is
subordinate to a proprietary interest. 45  By contrast, the interest of a
purchaser, 14 even one who has obtained only a security interest in some item
of personal property, is superior to a proprietary interest. 47  A bankruptcy
most notably, by the various state recording acts, by Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and
by federal bankruptcy law. The provisions of this section are accordingly subject to be altered, or
altogether displaced, by applicable statute law.").
143. See U.C.C. § 9-317 (2011) ("Interests that Take Priority Over or Take Free of Security
Interest or Agricultural Lien: (a) [Conflicting security interests and rights of lien creditors] A
security interest or agricultural lien is subordinate to the rights of: (1) a person entitled to priority
under Section 9-322; and (2) except as otherwise provided in subsection (e), a person that becomes a
lien creditor before the earlier of the time: (A) the security interest or agricultural lien is perfected; or
(B) one of the conditions specified in Section 9-203(b)(3) is met and a financing statement covering
the collateral is filed."); see also R3RUE § 60 cmt. e ("A restitution claimant who seeks to assert an
unrecorded security interest will typically be seeking a remedy via subrogation, as a means of
rectifying a transaction affected by fraud or mistake. The cases make it clear that § 9-317 does not
displace the law of subrogation; rather, the law of subrogation supplements the priorities established
by Article 9.").
144. See R3RUE §60; see also Osin v. Johnson, 243 F.2d 653, 657 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding that
the right of victim of fraud to constructive trust in property conveyed to defendant is superior to a
"judgment creditor possessing a statutory lien.").
145. See R3RUE § 60 cmt. a ("Restitution is advantageous to the claimant because the common
law (including the elements of both law and equity that make up this part of the law of restitution)
gives priority in insolvency to the rights of an owner over the rights of a creditor ...."). But see
R3RUE § 60 cmt. b ("Because a judicial lien creditor may be given the rights of a bona fide
purchaser by statute, the foregoing statements describe the outcome where no statue expands the lien
creditor's rights."). In any event, a claimant who cannot establish its interest in identifiable property
is entitled to a monetary claim against the defendant that ranks equally with other general creditors.
See R3RUE § 60(3).
146. See R3RUE § 66 ("Bona Fide Purchaser"); see infra Appendix A.
147. See R3RUE § 60(1), see infra Appendix A; see also Osin, 243 F.2d at 656 ("[T]he
relationship between appellant [claimant] and Johnson [defendant] did not give appellant a claim
superior to that of the trust holders who occupy the position of bona fide purchasers." (citing Colo.
Coal & Iron Co. v. United States, 123 U.S. 307,314 (1887))).
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trustee standing in the shoes of only a judicial lien creditor will thus not be
able to avoid a constructive trust.
However, § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code enhances the avoiding
powers of the bankruptcy trustee.'48 With the passage of the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, Congress gave the trustee the powers of a bona fide
purchaser of real estate with respect to certain transfers. 49 While section
60(1) of the R3RUE draws no distinction between personal property and real
estate-a proprietary remedial interest has priority over a creditor with a
judgment lien 5 ° but is subordinate to a purchaser'' in both cases-judicial
application of the avoiding powers and the vagaries of state recording laws
have complicated matters. A leading example of this complication is the
decision of the Seventh Circuit in Belisle v. Plunkett.5 where the court
,applied § 544(a)(3) to avoid a constructive trust. 53 Several years before
filing bankruptcy, Oliver Plunkett had obtained funds from a group of
investors and used the funds to purchase real estate in the U.S. Virgin
Islands in the name of the partnership. 54 Plunkett fraudulently took the
interests in his own name and ultimately filed bankruptcy.'55 Judge
Easterbrook acknowledged that, due to his fraud, Plunkett held the real
estate as a constructive trustee for the investors, 56 but went on to hold that
the bankruptcy trustee, armed with the powers of a bona fide purchaser
148. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (2006).
149. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at II U.S.C.
(2006)).
150. See R3RUE § 60 cmt. b ("[lit is undisputed that A's rights in X must be superior to those of
anyone who asserts an interest in X merely as B's general creditor."). This is the case even if B's
general creditor obtains a judgment lien. Id. ("When the question is adjudicated as a matter of
common law and equity, unmodified by statute, the answer uniformly given is that a judicial lien
creditor is not a purchaser for value .... ").
151. See id. ("[Ilt is likewise beyond question that A's right to restitution of X-though iron-clad
in a contest between A and B-will yield to the right of a transferee from B who purchases an
interest in X for value and without notice.").
152. 877 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1989).
153. Id. at 516.
154. Id. at 513 ("Through the spring and summer of 1979 Plunkett formed five partnerships to
raise the money for the acquisition. After getting the cash, Plunkett closed the deal in October
1979-in his own name, despite using partnership funds.").
155. Id.
156. Id. ("Plunkett bamboozled the partners and used for his own benefit the leasehold acquired
with partnership funds. Virgin Islands law impresses a constructive trust on the leasehold and its
fruits.").
under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, could avoid the unrecorded
proprietary interests of the claimants."'
Courts in the Ninth Circuit have also concluded that constructive trust
can be avoided under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code. In Seaway
Express5 ' a bank held a perfected security interest in its debtor's accounts.'59
The debtor exchanged one of its accounts for real estate in violation of the
security agreement."W The bank was aware of the exchange but took no
action to record any interest in the real estate. 6' After the debtor's filing
under Chapter 11, the bank claimed an interest in the price of the real estate
as "proceeds" of its borrower's accounts under Article 9, and as the
beneficiary of a constructive trust on the real estate.'62 The bank lost at all
levels on both claims.'63 With respect to a constructive trust, the Ninth
Circuit did not decide whether one existed on these facts,' 64 but held that the
trustee could avoid it under § 544(a)(3) in any event. 65 The court advanced
two reasons for its conclusion. First, it cited Plunkett without further
analysis. 66 Second, it rejected the bank's argument that it had done all it
could; it should not be mulcted, the bank had claimed, when it had no means
to perfect its interest in the real estate without the debtor's cooperation. 67 In
157. Id. at 515:
A bona fide purchaser from Plunkett would have taken ahead of the partners under local
law.... One of Plunkett's creditors, extending $100,000 against a collateral assignment
of the leasehold, actually obtained a position superior to that of the partners. The Trustee
claimed the same position for the estate ....
See also Bridge v. Midlantic Nat'l Bank (In re Bridge), 18 F.3d 195, 204 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that
under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code a trustee has power to avoid a claimant's right to the
remedy of equitable subrogation).
158. Nat'l Bank of Alaska v. Erickson (In re Seaway Express Corp.), 912 F.2d 1125 (9th Cir.
1990).
159. Id. at 1126.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1127.
163. Id.
164. Citing Humphries v. Riveland, 407 P.2d 967 (Wash. 1965) (en banc) and Antoine v.
Thornton (In re Estate of Thornton), 541 P.2d 1243 (Wash. Ct. App. 1975), the Ninth Circuit held
that Washington law authorized imposition of a constructive trust for simple breach of contract. In
re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d at 1127. In neither case did a Washington court impose a
constructive trust. For discussion of the limited situation in which the R3RUE recognizes a
proprietary remedy for breach of contract, see infra text accompanying notes 336-340.
165. In re Seaway Express Corp., 912 F.2d at 1128-29 ("When a creditor claims an inchoate
equitable interest in real property owned by the debtor at the commencement of the case, which
interest is not evidenced by a recorded instrument and not yet granted by a state court, the trustee as
bona fide purchaser prevails.").
166. Id. at 1129-30 ("Although the section [544(a)(3)] empowers the trustee to avoid transfers,
by its terms it also applies if no transfer has taken place." (quoting Belisle v. Plunkett, 877 F.2d 512,
515 (7th Cir. 1989))).
167. ld.at 1127.
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response, the Ninth Circuit pointed to Washington law and observed that the
bank could have sought the appointment of a "commissioner to file the deed
of trust on its behalf."'68 The bank's failure to employ a legal remedy when
it knew about the debtor's transaction suggests that the trustee could have
effectively employed the defense of laches.16 9
Other courts have rejected Plunkett, holding that the trustee's avoiding
powers under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code do not reach a
constructive trust.17 °  On such an account the avoiding powers are
inapplicable because a proprietary remedy arises upon a transfer to the
debtor and the avoiding powers reach only transfers by the debtor. 171 Thus,
the court in Rodolakis v. Pedone17 ' explicitly rejected the reasoning in
Plunkett and concluded that a trustee "can only avoid a transfer of real estate
previously made by the Debtor .... ." The opaque language of § 544(a)(3)
of the Bankruptcy Code that creates this confusion has been analyzed
168. Id. at 1129. Comment e to Section 60 of the R3RUE addresses the general effect of
recording acts on the priority of holders of proprietary remedies. See R3RUE § 60 cmt. e. The
comment begins by observing that "statutes of this kind are rarely significant to the priority contests
that are the subject of the present section." Id. "The transaction that underlies a typical restitution
claim will frequently be outside the scope of standard recording-act provisions" because recording
acts are designed to subordinate unrecorded interests of grantees to the creditors of grantors. Id.
Restitution claims are typically the opposite: "[I]t is Grantor (the restitution claimant) who seeks to
avoid the transaction, while it is Grantee's lien creditors who seek to confirm it. The language of a
typical recording act will not accommodate such a claim." Id. Comment e also remarks that
recording acts have frequently been held inapplicable to equitable interests generally. Id. However,
comment e goes on to concede that recording acts may cut off the proprietary remedies of grantees
in the face of competing claims of lien creditors of the grantor. Id. Such grantees, like the bank in
Seaway, have easy access to recording act protection.
169. See R3RUE § 70(2) ("[Tlhe relief to which the claimant would otherwise be entitled may be
barred if (a) the claimant has unreasonably delayed bringing or prosecuting the action, after the
clamant had notice of the facts .... ").
170. See, e.g., Rodolakis v. Pedone (In re Belba), 226 BR. 738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).
171. Briefly, the introductory paragraph of § 544(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lays out the trustee's
general power to "avoid any transfer of property of the debtor" while § 544(a)(3) speaks specifically
to the power of a "bona fide purchaser of real property" with respect to "such transfer." Plunkett
concluded that "such transfer" referred broadly to any transfer over which a bona fide purchaser
would have priority; Rodolakis, on the other hand, held that "such transfer" was limited to only the
set of those transfers described in the introductory paragraph, i.e., transfers by and not to the debtor.
172. Rodolakis v. Pedone (In re Belba), 226 B.R. 738 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1998).
173. Id. at 743. See also Vineyard v. McKenzie (In re Quality Holstein Leasing), 752 F.2d 1009,
1015 (5th Cir. 1985) ("[W]e find that the courts below erred in concluding that section 544
empowers a bankruptcy trustee to retain for the benefit of the estate property that the debtor obtained
by fraud and upon which state law has imposed a valid constructive trust."); Mills v. Brown (In re
Brown), 182 BR. 778, 782 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1995) ("[Section] 544(a)(3) limits the bankruptcy
trustee to avoiding transfers of real property made by the debtor .... ").
865
elsewhere, but the consensus favors preserving a proprietary remedy in the
face of avoidance by the trustee. 74
The R3RUE cannot effect interpretation of federal law. However,
comments to the rule of priority in section 60 of the R3RUE articulate the
historical common law basis for limiting the trustee's avoiding powers and
Congress has not clearly legislated to the contrary. Application of R3RUE
should thus change the result in Plunkett but not in Seaway.
V. EQUITABLE LIEN
A. From Equity
The remedy of equitable lien has received less attention than
constructive trust. Claimants often seem to plead it simply as an alternative
to its remedial cousin.'75 Success with constructive trust gives a claimant the
entire "bundle of sticks" of ownership, while an equitable lien represents
less than the whole. 76 On the other hand, the tight requirement between
unjust enrichment and the defendant's acquisition of title to identifiable
property is relaxed when the claimant seeks only an equitable lien.'77
Moreover, from a practical point of view, even a claimant who could prevail
on constructive trust might prefer an equitable lien if the property is worth
less than the claim or might decline in value. 78
While recognition of a constructive trust removes property from the
174. See, e.g., Kull, supra note 99; see also Gregg C. Gumbert, Note & Comment, The Trustee as
a Bona Fide Purchaser of Real Property in Bankruptcy: Making Sense of Section 544(a)(3), 15
BANKR. DEV.J. 121 (1998).
175. See, e.g., Wilde v. Wilde, 576 F. Supp. 2d 595, 605 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) ("When a constructive
trust extends only to a portion of the property [acquired with trust funds], it is generally known as an
equitable lien." (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTITUTION §§ 210, 161 cmt. a (1937);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 56 (Tentative Draft No. 5,
2007)).
176. See R3RUE § 56 cmt. b ("Constructive trust transfers ownership of specific property from
the holder of legal title to a person with a paramount equitable claim. By contrast, equitable lien (as
the name indicates) gives the claimant a security interest in property held by the defendant, rather
than ownership.").
177. See id. ("[C]onstructive trust requires that the transaction giving rise to unjust enrichment be
one in which the holder acquires title to the property in question or its traceable antecedents, in
violation of the claimant's rights; whereas equitable lien requires only that the holder's unjust
enrichment be traced into, or otherwise identified with, the property in which the claimant asserts a
security interest.").
178. See id. ("The choice between the remedies depends on the present value of the assets in
question. Because constructive trust gives the claimant ownership of an asset (or a share therein),
the value of the remedy fluctuates with the value of the asset. By contrast, equitable lien secures
payment of a liability that is fixed in amount: namely, the defendant's unjust enrichment at the
expense of the claimant, as determined by the rules of §§ 49-53. Constructive trust is the natural
choice for a case in which a wrongdoer has acquired an asset that has appreciated in value, while
equitable lien will be more favorable if the value of the asset has declined.").
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bankruptcy estate, imposition of an equitable lien simply secures the
defendant's obligation to pay money-a claim-with a lien on an
identifiable asset.'79 The property remains part of the bankruptcy estate
subject to the power of the claimant to seek adequate protection of its
interest, 80 and the claimant is ultimately entitled to the value of its lien on
liquidation"' or in reorganization.'82
As with constructive trust, the claimant must establish an underlying
claim in unjust enrichment before turning to the remedy of equitable lien.'83
Section 56 of the R3RUE provides that
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which
(a) the claimant's assets or services are applied to enhance or
preserve the value of particular property to which the defendant
has legal title, or more generally
(b) the connection between unjust enrichment and the
defendant's ownership of particular property makes it equitable
that the claimant have recourse to that property for the
satisfaction of the defendant's liability in restitution,
the claimant may be granted an equitable lien on the property in
question.14
Unlike the second element of a constructive trust-that the defendant
obtain title to identifiable property-an equitable lien requires only that the
claimant establish a "nexus between the transaction giving rise to the
179. R3RUE § 56 cmt. b ("Constructive trust transfers ownership of specific property from the
holder of legal title to a person with a paramount equitable claim. By contrast, equitable lien (as the
name indicates) gives the claimant a security interest in property held by the defendant, rather than
ownership.").
180. See, e.g., U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Maxon Eng'g Servs., Inc. (In re Maxon Eng'g Servs.,
Inc.) 332 B.R. 495 (Bankr. D.P.R. 2005) (stating that movant holding equitable lien is entitled to
adequate protection).
181. See, e.g., Lewis v. Diethorn, 893 F.2d 648 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that payment on account
of an equitable lien not avoidable as preference).
182. See, e.g., Pelle v. Seidle (in re 18th Ave. Dev. Corp.), 6 B.R. 284 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
183. See R3RUE § 56 ("(2) An equitable lien secures the obligation of the defendant to pay the
claimant the amount of the defendant's unjust enrichment as separately determined. Foreclosure of
an equitable lien is subject to such conditions as the court may direct."). See supra text
accompanying notes 33-54.
184. R3RUE § 56(l).
liability in unjust enrichment and the property in which the claimant seeks
remedial rights."'85 The connection between the predicate act and property
of the defendant is attenuated with the reduction of the required relationship.
Anticipating treatment of equitable liens in bankruptcy, the principle of pari
passu becomes stronger as the principle of property is expressed in weaker
terms.
B. Into Bankruptcy
1. Recognition
Some have classified equitable liens as a subset of constructive trusts. 86
Even though constructive trusts have been met with a mixed reception in
bankruptcy, no reported circuit court case has held that bankruptcy courts
may not impose an equitable lien as a remedy for unjust enrichment.'87
Equitable liens have been applied by bankruptcy courts to provide a remedy
to a claimant whose assets have been spent to improve property of the
defendant.'88 An equitable lien has been imposed on exempt unencumbered
property to trace the proceeds of insurance wrongfully diverted from a
mortgagee,'89 and on an innocent co-tenant's interest in property improved
with funds obtained by the other co-tenant's fraud."9° An equitable lien has
also been used for the insurer whose insurance proceeds were paid by
mistake to an insured who subsequently filed bankruptcy, 9 ' and for a former
185. Id. § 56 cmt. a.
186. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Allen, 724 P.2d 651, 658 (Colo. 1986) (en banc) ("When
imposed to prevent unjust enrichment, an equitable lien is a special and limited form of a
constructive trust."). This position is something of an overstatement. See Fulp v. Fulp, 140 S.E.2d
708, 712 (N.C. 1965) ("An equitable lien, or encumbrance, is not an estate in land, nor is it a right
which, in itself, may be the basis of a possessory action. It is simply a charge upon the property,
which charge subjects the property to the payment of the debt of the creditor in whose favor the
charge exists.").
187. See, e.g., Provencher v. Berman, 699 F.2d 568, 570 (1st Cir. 1983) ("In such a situation
[where a conscious wrongdoer has used commingled funds to buy property], the innocent party can
choose either to enforce a lien on the property for the value of the estate's funds or to enforce a
constructive trust on the property. This is a virtually universal rule .... "); see also Levy v. Kozyak
(In re Fin. Federated Title & Trust, Inc.), 347 F.3d 880 (11th Cir. 2003) (affirming order of
bankruptcy court imposing equitable lien against otherwise exempt homestead property acquired
with proceeds of fraud); Goldberg v. NJ. Lawyer's Fund (In re Goldberg), 932 F.2d 273 (3d Cir.
1991).
188. See, e.g., Carlson Orchards, Inc. v. Linsey (In re Linsey), 296 B.R. 582 (Bankr. D. Mass.
2003).
189. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson (In re Wilson), 269 B.R. 829 (Bankr. D.N.D. 2001).
190. See, e.g., Fin. Federated Title & Trust, 347 F.3d 880; In re Mesa, 232 B.R. 508 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1999).
191. See Travelers Ins. Co. v. Angus (In re Angus), 9 B.R. 769 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981).
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spouse whose unsecured claim to proceeds due on sale of the marital
residence would be discharged in the bankruptcy of the other spouse. 19 2
2. Avoidance
The Third Circuit affirmed avoidance of an equitable lien in real
property in Midlantic National Bank v. Bridge.'93 The claimant bank
refinanced its borrower's mortgage.'94 The closing agent recorded a
satisfaction of the original mortgage but failed to record the new mortgage
securing the financed debt.'95  The borrower/mortgagor then filed
bankruptcy.'9 6 The circuit court affirmed Midlantic's claim to an equitable
lien' 97 but concluded that a subsequent purchaser for value would take free
of the lien under New Jersey law. 99  Section 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides that the trustee has the more extensive powers of a bona fide
purchaser for value as of the filing.'99 Thus, the trustee had the power to
avoid Midlantic's equitable lien on the debtor's real property.
The court's decision (and New Jersey law) is consistent with section 56
of the R3RUE. As comment f observes, "[t]he modem equitable lien is
usually [but not exclusively] employed as a remedy for unjust
enrichment."2" In the Midlantic case, the defendant was not enriched
because he still owed Midlantic repayment of the money lent.2"' However,
to the extent that his property was no longer subject to a recorded mortgage,
the likelihood of the bank recovering the debt was diminished.2 2 The
192. See Hart v. Hart (In re Hart), 50 B.R. 956 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985), questioned by the 9th Cir.
in Stedman v. Pederson (In re Pederson), 875 F.2d 781 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Wells v. Wells (Iti
re Wells), 160 B.R. 726 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1993).
193. Midlantic Nat'l Bank v. Bridge (In re Bridge), 18 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 1994).
194. Id. at 197.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 198.
197. id. at 201 ("[When] a creditor's new security ... prove[s] to be defective due to fraud or
some kind of mistake.... the doctrine of equitable subrogation can operate to subrogate the new
creditor to the position of the lender whose lien was discharged and permits the new creditor to
assert its right to priority against subsequent claimants.").
198. Id. at 204 ("We therefore conclude that, under New Jersey law, the rights of the trustee, as a
hypothetical bona fide purchaser of real property for value without notice, prevail over the rights of
Midlantic, as the holder of an unrecorded equitable lien, and prevent the operation of equitable
subrogation in this case.").
199. See supra text accompanying notes 148-51.
200. R3RUE § 56 cmt. f.
201. See In re Bridge, 18 F.3d at 197.
202. Id. at 197-98.
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erroneous elimination of the encumbrance thus indirectly enriches a
debtor.0 3 Subsequent enrichment of third parties such as creditors is even
clearer.2" Unencumbered title to a debtor's property increases the assets
available for their payment.0 5 Yet, section 66 of the R3RUE observes that
good-faith purchasers for value take "free of equitable interests that a
restitution claimant might have asserted. 20 6 Given that § 544(a)(3) of the
Bankruptcy Code provides the bankruptcy trustee with the status of such a
purchaser , the Midlantic court correctly affirmed the avoidance of the
bank's equitable lien.20 7
Other courts have avoided equitable liens in bankruptcy as preferential
transfers. 2 ' The bankruptcy court in Cedar Funding held that the equitable
liens of hundreds of investors in mortgages originated by the debtor did not
protect their equitable interests from avoidance by the trustee.20 9 According
to the court, assignments of fractional interests in the mortgages recorded
within the ninety-day preference period were avoidable notwithstanding any
pre-existing equitable lien held by the assignees. 2"1  Had the court held that
the investors had constructive liens from the outset, the later-conveyed
mortgages would not have improved their positions.2m In effect, they simply
would have exchanged their equitable proprietary interests for legal ones and
would not have received more than they would have had there been no
mortgages; thus, no preferential transfer.1 2
Cedar Funding drew support for its conclusion from dicta of the district
court in Cadle Co. v. Mangan.213 The labyrinthine facts of Cadle reveal just
how difficult it is to collect a judgment from a recalcitrant debtor.m 4
203. R3RUE § 56 cmt. f (Tentative Draft No. 6, 2008) ("Sometimes an equitable lien [is]
explained by reference to the apparent or presumed intentions of the parties ... .
204. See R3RUE § 56 cmt. f(201 I).
205. See id.
206. R3RUE § 66; see infra Appendix A.
207. See In re Bridge,18 F.3d at 204. That the unrecorded transfer was by the debtor in Midlantic
distinguishes it from Plunkett. See supra text accompanying notes 152-157.
208. See Neilson v. Aguirre (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), Bankr. No. 08-52709-MM, 2010 WL
1346365, at *6 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010).
209. Id.
210. Id. ("[lit would make little sense to impose an equitable lien under the circumstances of this
proceeding because any such lien would be avoidable as a preference."); see also Sovran Bank v.
United States (In re Aumiller), 168 B.R. 811 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1994) (finding that an equitable lien
arose at time of claimant's demand for recording).
211. Cf. In re Cedar Funding, 2010 WL 1346365, at *6.
212. See, II U.S.C. § 547 (2006) ("(b) [T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property-(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive
if -(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title; (B) the transfer had not been made; and (C)
such creditor received payment of such debt to the extent provided by the provisions of this title.").
213. 316 B.R. II (Bankr. D. Conn. 2004), affd sub nom. Cadle Co. v. Mangan (In re Flanagan),
503 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2007).
214. Id.
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Distilled to a minimum, Cadle had a judgment against Charles Flanagan.2" 5
Flanagan failed to surrender his valuable shares of stock in a closely-held
corporation notwithstanding various post-judgment orders of Connecticut
courts. ' However, shortly before filing bankruptcy, Flanagan at last paid
Cadle with the proceeds of a loan from his father."' When the trustee sued
to recover the payment as a preference, Cadle claimed the payment had been
fully secured by an equitable lien on the underlying stock."z 8 Even though
the court concluded that Cadle did not have an equitable lien under
Connecticut law, citing the first Restatement of Restitution, 219 it went on to
hold in dicta that in any event equitable liens do not "relate back" to the time
of the predicate wrongdoing but instead only to the time of enforcement.2
Because Cadle, despite his best efforts, had not successfully enforced his
equitable lien before the preference period, the judgment against Flanagan
was never secured and the payment to Cadle was an avoidable preference.22'
Use of the phrase "equitable lien" by the courts in Midlantic, Cedar
Funding, and Cadle exposes a latent ambiguity. 222 Equitable lien may refer
to either a remedy for an uncompleted and thus unperfected secured
22312transaction or to a remedy for unjust enrichment.2 4  Section 56 of the
215. Id. at 14.
216. Id. at 14-15.
217. Id. at 15.
218. Id. at 21-22 ("The narrower argument that Appellants make is that had they received a
perfected judicial lien absent Flanagan's misconduct, then, for preference purposes, the perfection of
the lien itself would be unavoidable as a transfer, as it would have come into existence prior to the
90-day preference period, and Flanagan's subsequent payment of $99,542.87 would be unavoidable
because it would not have improved Cadle's position.").
219. Id. at 22 (citing RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF RESTrruTION § 161(1937) ("Where property of
one person can by a proceeding in equity be reached by another as security for a claim on the ground
that otherwise the former would be unjustly enriched, an equitable lien arises.")). For the modem
statement of the rule, see R3RUE § 56 (2011).
220. Cadle Co., 316 B.R. at 23 (quoting NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE 2d § 57:29)
("The appropriate conclusion is that, for purposes of Code § 547, an equitable lien is transferred
when steps to declare or enforce it are taken and without the benefit of any relation-back principle.
As a result, if the lien is enforced within the relevant preference period, and other elements of a
preference are present, it will typically constitute an avoidable transfer for an antecedent debt.")).
221. Id.
222. See infra notes 231-34 and accompanying text.
223. See R3RUE § 56 cmt. e ("Equitable lien as a means to establish intended security. One of
the most characteristic uses of equitable lien is to readjust transactions that have miscarried-
because of mistake, inattention, or wrongful interference-depriving the claimant of an intended
element of security. Employed in this way, an equitable lien takes the place of the consensual lien
that the claimant would have obtained if the transaction had gone as originally planned.").
224. See R3RUE § 56 cmt. a ("As with all of the asset-based remedies in restitution, moreover,
the claimant must establish a nexus between the transaction giving rise to the liability in unjust
R3RUE § 56 explicitly authorizes both applications,225 but the principle of
pari passu presents the stronger case when the claimant neglected to protect
its proprietary interest through available legal means.226 Indeed, the
comprehensive scope of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
effectively preempts any place for equitable perfection of security interests
in personal property.227 Even though room remains under state law for
equitable perfection with respect to an interest in real estate, the principle of
pari passu-buttressed by the trustee's avoiding powers under § 544(a)(3) of
the Bankruptcy Code-warrants the avoidance of such an equitable lien in
bankruptcy .228
Conversely, where a claimant has established a predicate for a claim of
unjust enrichment rather than a simple failure to perfect a legal interest, the
remedy of equitable lien should be available notwithstanding the defendant's
bankruptcy.229 Courts should resolve issues related to the avoidability of
equitable liens as a remedy for unjust enrichment as they do constructive
trusts.
2 30
enrichment and the property in which the claimant seeks remedial rights.").
225. Id.
226. See id. § 56 cmt. e ("Any such use of the equitable lien [to establish intended security] is
potentially in conflict with the formal arrangements by which consensual liens are normally created
and perfected. Before a court will impose an equitable lien to rescue a claimant who has failed to
take appropriate steps to obtain security, it must be satisfied that the remedy will not undermine the
relevant statutory scheme."); see also Naja, L.L.C. v. Jack's Co. (In re Dynamis Group, LL.C.), 441
B.R. 841 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2011) (filing lis pendens preserved equitable lien of unperfected land
contract vendor); Hassett v. Revlon, Inc. (In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc.), 23 B.R. 104, 119
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("[Aln equitable lien will not be upheld as against a trustee where all
available means of perfecting a legal lien were not employed by the would-be secured creditor.").
227. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 1 (2011) ("As did its predecessor, it [Revised Article 9]
provides a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of security interests in personal property and
fixtures."). But see infra text accompanying notes 273-96 for the role of subrogation with respect to
existing perfected security interests.
228. It would have done less violence to the law of unjust enrichment had the Cedar Funding
court permitted avoidance of the equitable lien under § 544(a)(3) of the Bankruptcy Code, rather
than as a preference. See Neilson v. Aguirre (In re Cedar Funding, Inc.), Bankr. No. 08-52709-
MM, 2010 WL 1346365 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Apr. 5, 2010). Contrary to the court's holding, comment
e to section 56 of the R3RUE observes that "[l]ike a constructive trust, an equitable lien is effective
at the time of the transaction that gives rise to it, not when its existence is subsequently declared by
the court." The debtor's assignments of interests in the underlying mortgages occurred long before
the preference period. See id. For discussion of the legitimate application of § 544(a)(3) in such a
situation, see supra text accompanying notes 172-73 discussing Seaway Express.
229. See, e.g., Lui-M Corp. v Garland Corp. (In re Garland Corp.), 6 B.R. 452, 455 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1980) (applying Florida law) ("There is [legal] authority for granting an equitable lien when
legal rights are lost as a result of fraud."); see also Mulhern v. Albin, 163 F.2d 41 (8th Cir. 1947)
("The bankruptcy court was empowered to distribute to creditors of the bankrupt only such interest
in property as the bankrupt had. Where, as in this case, she had only a legal title to the lands
accruing to her through fraudulent conduct ... the bankruptcy court may not refuse to recognize the
equitable lien ....").
230. See supra Part IV.
872
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VI. SUBROGATION
A. From Equity
The third proprietary remedy described in the R3RUE is subrogation.23'
Ambiguous use of the term "subrogation" makes it important to distinguish
232between the claim and the remedy, each going by the same name.
1. Subrogation as a Claim-Equitable Subrogation
Section 24 of the R3RUE describes the claim of equitable
subrogation.233 Like the better-known remedies of indemnity and
contribution,234 equitable subrogation reallocates ultimate responsibility from
one who paid a debt to another whom the law deems should have paid it.233
Unlike indemnity and contribution, however, equitable subrogation applies
when the claims against the obligors arise from different bases of liability.236
Comparison of several illustrations makes this distinction clear. When two
persons are jointly liable on a note, payment by one creates a claim against
the other by operation of law; 237 thus, when two obligors are liable on the
same claim and one pays, the claimant's remedy is labeled
indemnification.238 Illustration 1 to section 23 of the R3RUE provides an
example:
A becomes an accommodation endorser on a note for $10,000
payable to B, issued by C and D as co-makers. A signs at the sole
231. See R3RUE § 57 ("Subrogation as a Remedy"); see infra Appendix A.
232. See id. § 24 cmt. b ("The ambiguous term 'subrogation').
233. Id. § 24 ("Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable Subrogation)"); see infra
Appendix A.
234. See id. § 23 ("Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and Contribution)"); see infra
Appendix A.
235. See R3RUE § 24 cmt. b ("[A] claim under this section is independent of contract .... It
arises, rather, as a function of the obligors' respective positions vis-A-vis the third-party obligee and
of the events giving rise to the obligee's underlying claim. It rests on the equitable principle,
expressed in innumerable decisions, that seeks 'to compel the ultimate discharge of a debt by him
who in equity and good conscience ought to pay it."').
236. See id. § 24 cmt. d ("The most frequent claim within § 24 is one that arises between
independent obligors. Here both claimant and defendant are liable to the third-party obligee, but on
different grounds; the claimant asserts (as in cases of indemnity) that the defendant's obligation was
in some relevant sense primary and its own merely secondary.").
237. See id. § 23.
238. Id. § 23 cmt. a.
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request of C and without the knowledge of D. The note being
unpaid at maturity, A pays B $10,000. A has a claim to indemnity in
the amount of $10,000, enforceable against C and D or either of
them. (See U.C.C. § 3-419(e) (rev. 1990).) C's liability to
indemnify A is simultaneously explained in terms of contract and in
terms of restitution, while D's liability to A is in restitution
exclusively .239
All the claims of payee B against A, C, and D arise from the same
underlying obligation, the promissory note. Thus, indemnity is the form of
A's remedy against C and D. Conversely, Illustration 1 to section 24 of the
R3RUE gives an example of claims against two obligors whose legal bases
are distinct:
Vendor sells Blackacre to Purchaser with a warranty against
encumbrances. Purchaser's title is insured by Title Co. Blackacre
is subject to an undisclosed encumbrance that diminishes its value.
Title Co. compensates Purchaser for the loss. Title Co. (whose
obligation to Purchaser derives from the insurance contract) has a
claim under this section against Vendor (whose obligation to
Purchaser derives from the deed).240
Even though there is no preexisting legal relationship between Vendor
and Title Co., the law has long insisted24" ' that Vendor would be unjustly
enriched were Title Co. not able to compel it to share in the liability each
owed to Purchaser.242 Such compulsory sharing is labeled equitable
subrogation .243
2. Subrogation as a Claim-A "Better Right"
As Justice Black observed years ago, "probably there are few doctrines
better established than that a surety who pays the debt of another is entitled
to all the rights of the person he paid to enforce his right to be
239. R3RUE § 23 cmt. a, illus. 1 (italics added).
240. See id. § 24 cmt. a, illus. 1.
241. See, e.g., In re Lentz's Accounts, Wallace's Appeal, 5 Pa. 103 (Pa. 1847).
242. See Douberley v. Angelini, 240 So.2d 98, 99 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1970):
The title insurer discharged its liability under its title insurance policy by payment to
the purchasers of the amount agreed upon between them as to the value of the part taken,
and thereupon the title insurer became subrogated to the rights of the purchasers against
the sellers for breach of warranty.
For a recent case that failed to credit the role of equitable subrogation, see Wilder Corp. of Del. v.
Thompson Drainage & Levee Dist., 658 F.3d 802,807 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (dicta).
243. See R3RUE § 24.
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reimbursed. 244  Section 48 of the R3RUE states the substantive basis in
unjust enrichment for the subrogation claim by the surety or other third party
who discharges the obligation of a primary obligor; in short, the surety has
what the R3RUE characterizes as a "better right. ' 245 Not only does payment
by the claimant create a right against the primary obligor under the principle
of equitable subrogation,246 but the same payment generates a claim against a
third party who would receive or retain payment due to the primary obligor
because of the claimant's payment.247 In a typical case, a surety's
intervention permits a project to be completed notwithstanding the default of
the primary obligor. The surety's action thus satisfies a condition to a duty
of a third party (typically the owner) to pay. The payment should, the law of
equity has long held, be made to the surety even if the third party did not
expressly so promise. 48 The surety has a "better right" than the primary
obligor to get it or than the third party to keep it.249 By extension, the "better
right" of the surety vis-A-vis both the primary obligor and the third party has
priority over the obligor's secured creditor 25 and trustee in bankruptcy.251
244. Pearlman v. Reliance Ins. Co., 371 U.S. 132, 136-37 (1962). Justice Black went on to
comment that "there is a security interest in a withheld fund ... to which the surety is
subrogated . i..." ld. at 137.
245. R3RUE § 48 ("Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right"); see
Appendix A.
246. See supra text accompanying notes 241-45; infra text accompanying notes 247-50.
247. See R3RUE § 48 cmt. a ("In its application to many cases, the rule of § 48 is best understood
and explained as the logical converse to the rules of §§ 23-24 governing indemnity, contribution,
and equitable subrogation. Enrichment under the latter headings derives from the claimant's
discharge of an obligation for which the defendant is primarily responsible, while enrichment under
§ 48 derives from the defendant's receipt of a payment to which the claimant is primarily entitled.");
see also R3RUE § 57 cmt. e ("When A's money is used to discharge B's obligation to C, the most
visible effect of subrogation is to clothe A with C's former rights against B and B's property.
Subrogation extends to another important mode of substitution, permitting A to enforce not only C's
rights against B but B's rights in the transaction as well, such as obligations of performance owed to
B by C or other parties .... " (italics added)).
248. Pearlman, 371 U.S. at 136 ("Traditionally sureties compelled to pay debts for their principal
have been deemed entitled to reimbursement, even without a contractual promise ... .
249. See R3RUE § 48.
250. See First Indem. of Am. Ins. Co. v. Modular Structures, Inc. (In re Modular Structures, Inc.),
27 F.3d 72 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that payments due from obligor were neither "accounts" of the
defaulting debtor/primary obligee nor property of the estate and thus were properly payable to
surety); see also R3RUE § 48 illus. 28 ("Farmer grows corn on land leased from Landlord. Farmer's
operations are financed by Bank, which holds a perfected security interest in Farmer's growing crops
and their proceeds. By statute, Landlord has a lien on the products of the leased acreage securing
Farmer's obligation to pay rent. (The statute provides that a crop lien of the kind held by Landlord is
not a 'security interest' within the local version of U.C.C. Article 9 and that it is 'paramount to all
other liens or claims' upon such products and their proceeds.) Farmer sells his corn crop to Elevator
for $25,000. Elevator pays farmer with a check payable to Farmer and Bank jointly; Farmer
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Similar conclusions follow outside the typical suretyship context,
although the fact-driven analysis of "better right" makes it more difficult to
predict judicial conclusions. Thus, in Rinn v. First Union,252 the district
court held that a refinancing but unperfected secured creditor should be
subrogated to the still-filed interest of the discharged secured creditor and
prevail over the bankruptcy trustee.253 But the bankruptcy court in Vieira v.
Pearce.54 found that, unlike the debtor in Rinn, the debtors had not agreed to
deliver a first secured position to their refinancing creditor whose late
recording rendered its mortgage avoidable as a preference.255  The
bankruptcy court in Pearce therefore concluded that the refinancing creditor
did not have a "better right" than the primary obligor and mortgagor.256 The
determination of the "better right" necessary to establish a claim against a
defendant other than the primary obligor is not a free-floating exercise of
moral inquiry; the right must be one "that is both recognized, and accorded
priority over the interest of the defendant, under the law of the
jurisdiction." '257 Given the usual ability of the claimant to protect itself, the
principle of pari passu should inform the analysis of the bankruptcy court
and generally supersede such an atypical claim of subrogation.
endorses the check, and Bank applies the proceeds against Farmer's outstanding debt to Bank.
When Bank obtains payment of the check, Bank is aware that Farmer owes Landlord $15,000 in rent
that was due on sale of the crop. Landlord is entitled to recover $15,000 from Bank by the rule of
this section. As between the competing obligees (Landlord and Bank), the priority of Landlord's
claim is established by the crop lien statute; while Bank's notice of Landlord's claim deprives Bank
of the defense it could otherwise assert as a bona fide payee (§ 67).").
251. See Pearlman, 371 U.S. 132.
252. Rinn v. First Union Nat'l Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995).
253. Id. at 416. In arriving at this holding, the court explained:
Section 1-103 of the U.C.C. provides, however, that "[u]nless displaced by the particular
provisions of [the U.C.C.] ... the principles of law and equity ... shall supplement its
provisions." Courts have consistently held that "[n]othing in the provisions of Title 9
regarding secured transactions expressly or implicitly refutes the application of
subrogation." Therefore, the formal procedures mandated by the U.C.C. may be
supplemented by the principles of equitable subrogation.
Id. at 410 (citations omitted).
254. Vieira v. Pearce (In re Pearce), 236 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1999).
255. Id. at 265 ("Unlike in Rinn where, the debtors agreed to continuation of the first lender's
perfected status as provided in the commitment letter, there is no indication here of any agreement
that Bumett would assume Fleet's perfected status in the subject real estate.").
256. Id. at 267.
257. R3RUE § 48 cmt. i. Comment i goes on to observe that:
Proof merely that the defendant has received a windfall, that the claimant has been ill-
treated, and that the third party's payment to the defendant (or the defendant's retention
of payment as against the claimant) violates rules of good faith, basic fairness, or
common decency, does not suffice to make out a claim in restitution under § 48 ....
Id.
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3. Subrogation as a Remedy
Subrogation as a remedy is described in section 57 of the R3RUE.255
Like constructive trust and equitable lien, this remedy requires both an
instance of unjust enrichment and a "transactional nexus" with identifiable
property of the defendant. 9  Unlike constructive trust and equitable lien,
however, the remedy of subrogation does not arise out of the acquisition of
identifiable property or even the improvement of specific property, but
rather from the use of the claimant's property "to satisfy an obligation of the
defendant or [to discharge] a lien on the defendant's property. ' 26  The
defendant's enrichment in such a case is not by gaining new assets, but from
a reduction in liabilities secured by old ones. The latter is no less a type of
enrichment than the former.261
Moreover, unlike constructive trust and equitable lien, subrogation as a
remedy is not necessarily limited to remedying substantive claims of unjust
enrichment. Subrogation by contract is the most commonly employed form
of the remedy, particularly in contracts of insurance.262 Subrogation is also
part of the law of suretyship apart from any substantive basis in unjust
enrichment.263 This Article, however, will consider only the implications of
subrogation as a remedy for a substantive claim of unjust enrichment.
258. Id. § 57 ("Subrogation as a Remedy"); see infra Appendix A.
259. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a ("Subrogation (using the word in its remedial sense) is one of the
methods of asset-based restitution that may be available to a claimant who can establish both (i)
unjust enrichment at the expense of the claimant, and (ii) a transactional nexus making it appropriate
that the claimant obtain restitution via rights in identifiable property of the defendant.");see also id.
("Unjust enrichment for which subrogation is an available remedy may be established by any of the
substantive rules of this Restatement that describe the transaction in question."); see also supra text
accompanying notes 35-56.
260. R3RUE § 57 cmt. a.
261. See id. § 1 cmt. d ("A saved expenditure or a discharged obligation is no less beneficial to
the recipient than a direct transfer.").
262. See id. § 24 cmt. b ("A contractual subrogation provision is typically a term in an insurance
contract by which the policyholder agrees that the insurer, on paying a loss, shall be entitled to assert
the policyholder's right of recovery against persons responsible. The effect to be given to such a
provision is a matter of contract and insurance law."); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) SURETYSHIP
& GUAR. § 28 (1996) (distinguishing between contracts of indemnity and other forms of insurance).
263. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a ("Subrogation is even more prominent in the law of suretyship,
where a right to subrogation-whether based on unjust enrichment or otherwise-is one of the
classic incidents of the relationship between principal and surety."); see also U.C.C. § 3-419(f) ("An
accommodation party who pays the instrument is entitled to reimbursement from the accommodated
party and is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party. An accommodated
party who pays the instrument has no right of recourse against, and is not entitled to contribution
from, an accommodation party."); U.C.C. §3-419 cmt. 5 ("Since the accommodation party that pays
the instrument is entitled to enforce the instrument against the accommodated party, the
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Subrogation as a remedy can intersect with a defendant's insolvency
proceedings in two important respects. First, subrogation to security can
affect recoveries when more than two parties are involved.2" When there is
a single claimant and only one defendant, a claimant's discharge of a lien on
the defendant's property can be remedied equally well by payment of the
amount discharged or by substituting the claimant to the position of the
discharged lienor.265 But the relationships are more complex when there are
junior lienholders.266 Payment of the amount discharged will always satisfy
the claimant. However, when the defendant is insolvent and unable to pay,
only subrogation to the lien of the discharged lienor will be an adequate
remedy. Illustration 8 to section 57 of the R3RUE describes such a scenario:
Blackacre has been mortgaged in succession to A and to B.
Taxes on the property are delinquent: A pays the amount due to
prevent a tax sale. When A commences foreclosure proceedings,
the court determines that A's mortgage was improperly recorded,
with the result that B's later mortgage has first priority. Because the
present value of Blackacre is insufficient to cover the mortgage debt
to B, A's payment of taxes has preserved the value of B's mortgage
instead of his own. A has a claim in restitution to prevent B's unjust
enrichment at A's expense (§ 8(2)). The remedy is by subrogation
to the tax lien that A's funds were used to discharge.267
A's payment of the property taxes clearly enriched the owner of
Blackacre. And if Blackacre's owner doesn't pay, A has a claim in unjust
enrichment against him.268 But what of B-has A's payment of taxes on
Blackacre enriched her? The answer is equally yes. Had A not paid the
taxes, B's recovery would have been reduced pro tanto. B has thus been
enriched, but the question remains whether this enrichment is unjust.
According to section 8(2) of the R3RUE, it would be unjust due to A's
mistake about the status of its mortgage. 269 Thus, unless B pays A, A will be
subrogated to the priority of the discharged tax lien.
Second, the law of equity provided that a claimant entitled to
subrogation is also entitled to "the priority of a preferred but unsecured
accommodation party also obtains rights to any security interest or other collateral that secures
payment of the instrument.").
264. See generally R3RUE § 57.
265. See supra note 269 and accompanying text.
266. See, e.g., Stein v. Simpson, 230 P.2d 816, 820 (Cal. 1951) (en banc) (acknowledging junior
lienholder's right to redeem property and be subrogated to the benefits of the senior lienholder).
267. R3RUE § 57 illus. 8 (italics added).
268. R3RUE § 26 ("Protection of Claimant's Property"); see infra Appendix A.
269. R3RUE § 8 ("Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien"); see infra Appendix A.
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creditor. 270  Outside of bankruptcy this rule may remain the case, but
§ 507(d) of the Bankruptcy Code provides otherwise for cases arising under
Title 1 1.27 Thus, apart from subrogation to security, subrogation as remedy
for unjust enrichment will have little impact in bankruptcy.272
B. Into Bankruptcy
Subrogation as a remedy historically has presented little difficulty in
bankruptcy. 273 Both constructive trust and equitable lien subject property to
which the debtor holds unencumbered legal title to an equitable proprietary
claim.274 Subrogation, by contrast, substitutes a third party to the rights held
by another.275 By definition, the debtor's estate is made no worse, although
the opportunity for its enhancement is foregone. 276 Recognition of this well-
recognized principle of property continues in the R3RUE.
Section 57 of the R3RUE27 7 provides a rule for subrogation to the
collateral position of a discharged lienor. As with the other proprietary
remedies, the claimant must establish that the defendant has been unjustly
enriched.278 Subrogation may also follow the result of the application of the
law of equitable subrogation in section 24 of the R3RUE279 or the "better
right" analysis of section 48 of the R3RUE25 ° but, in any case, is chiefly
270. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. c.
271. 11 U.S.C. § 507(d) (2006) ("An entity that is subrogated to the rights of a holder of a claim
of a kind specified in subsection (a)(1), (a)(4), (a)(5), (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(8), or (a)(9) of this section is
not subrogated to the right of the holder of such claim to priority under such subsection.").
However, a subrogated creditor may be subrogated to the non-dischargeable status of the creditor's
claim. See, e.g., Reitzel v. DeLong (In re DeLong), 228 BR. 406 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1998).
272. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. d ("As a matter of equitable principle the claimant is entitled via
subrogation to every advantage afforded by the creditor's previous rights against the defendant, but
this starting hypothesis is subject to qualification in important respects. The standard example of a
further advantage that might be acquired via subrogation -apart from security and priority, normally
the most important-is the benefit of a favorable statute of limitations; but the claimant may be
denied this advantage if the court concludes that it derives from the status of the former creditor,
rather than from the nature of the former obligation.").
273. See 11 U.S.C. § 509.
274. See generally R3RUE § 55 (constructive trusts); id. § 56 (equitable liens).
275. See id. § 57(1)(a).
276. See id. § 57 cmt. (a).
277. See supra note 267.
278. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. a ("The first requirement of the subrogation remedy, as here
described, is that a liability in unjust enrichment be established by rules stated elsewhere in this
Restatement.").
279. See discussion supra Part VI.A.1.
280. See discussion supra Part VI.A.2.
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significant when the obligor defendant is insolvent. It is the benefit of a
collateral position to which the claimant is subrogated by the rule of section
57 of the R3RUE thus, if the defendant is able to pay, subrogation is moot.2"'
In other words, when the defendant whose position has been improved by
the claimant's discharge of an obligation or lien cannot pay, the claimant
takes over whatever collateral rights the third party lienor had in the assets of
the defendant.282
The remedy of subrogation thus diminishes the opportunity of unsecured
or junior secured creditors to be paid in full. Only a conclusion that such
innocent third parties themselves would otherwise be unjustly enriched can
justify this result. 83 A comment to section 57 of the R3RUE asserts that
"[slubrogation of the claimant is not prejudicial to the other creditors
because its purpose and effect is to confirm the several claims against the
defendant's property in their intended priorities.""28 Yet it is not self-evident
why "other creditors" should not benefit from the unrecorded or unperfected
intentions of the claimant and defendant. A better justification for the
effects of subrogation on other creditors can be found by looking to the
substantive law of unjust enrichment rather than searching for undisclosed
intentions. Section 8(2) of the R3RUE identifies a blanket rule of unjust
enrichment that will provide many claimants seeking subrogation with the
substantive predicate of a claim vis-A-vis other creditors .285 Funds paid to
discharge a lien will generate a claim of unjust enrichment against other
creditors if the claimant intended to obtain a priority interest in property and
failed to get it because of "a mistake about title to the encumbered property,
the existence of intervening liens, or other relevant circumstances." '86 Only
mistake, not wrongdoing by the defendant, is required, and even negligence
by the claimant does not make a defendant's enrichment just.287
Such a broad basis for unjust enrichment against innocent creditors
281. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. e.
282. See id. § 57 cmt. a ("Subrogation becomes a meaningful remedy principally when the
restitution claimant is in competition with general creditors of the defendant, and when the
obligation that was satisfied with the claimant's money enjoyed some form of priority over the
claims of general creditors. In the great majority of cases, the reason for subrogation is that the
claimant's funds have been applied to satisfy a secured claim ... .
283. See id. § 57 cmt. b.
284. Id.
285. See supra text accompanying note 269.
286. R3RUE § 8(2). For an example of "no mistake, no subrogation," see Vieira v. Pearce (In re
Pearce), 236 B.R. 261 (Bankr. S.D. 111. 1999). For criticism of the rule of the R3RUE, see JAMES J.
WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1322-23 (6th ed. 2010).
287. See R3RUE § 5(4); see also id. § 5 cmt. f ("Because the primary function of restitution for
benefits conferred by mistake is to rectify the consequences of error and inadvertence, any
suggestion that restitution should be available only in cases of non-negligent mistake would be flatly
inconsistent with the decided cases.").
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reveals the extent of the predisposition of the law of equity for the principle
of property.2 88 However, section 57(3) of the R3RUE cuts back on the scope
of potential unjust enrichment with a "balancing-of-the-equities" rule: "The
remedy of subrogation may be qualified or withheld when necessary to
avoid an inequitable result in the circumstances of a particular case." The
principal example of a result sufficiently inequitable to block subrogation is
one where "other creditors" relied on the absence of a properly filed or
recorded lien.2 89 Generalizing, this is the application of the well-recognized
rule that a bona fide purchaser, which includes a secured creditor, takes free
of all legal or equitable claims, including claims of subrogation."g The
proprietary remedy recognized by equity may be trimmed by equity.29" '
Subrogation claims have generally met with success in the bankruptcy
setting. The Eleventh Circuit has applied subrogation as a remedy to prevent
avoidance of the interest of a refinancing mortgagee292 while the Third
Circuit went so far as to subrogate real estate purchasers to the position of
the mortgagee whose lien had been paid by the purchase-money lender.293
Numerous cases have also implicitly subrogated bulk assignees of security
interests to the position of the originally perfected secured party.294
288. See RESTATEMENT (FiRST) OFREsTrrunToN § 162 (1937) (stating virtually identical rule).
289. See R3RUE § 57 cmt. b, illus. 11 ("Company borrows $50,000 from Bank to buy a new
truck, giving Bank a security interest which Bank duly perfects. Three years later, with the Bank
loan in default, Company borrows $35,000 from Trust Co. on the security of the truck and uses the
proceeds of the new loan to repay Bank. Bank's security interest is discharged of record, but Trust
Co. neglects to perfect its security interest. Six months later the Trust Co. loan is in default with a
balance of $30,000; Company is insolvent; the court appoints Receiver to dispose of Company's
assets. After the truck is sold at auction for $20,000, Receiver and Trust Co. assert competing
claims to the proceeds in the hands of Receiver. Trust Co.'s unperfected security interest is
subordinate to the interest of Receiver as "lien creditor" (U.C.C. §§ 9-317(a)(2), 9-102(a)(52) (rev.
2000)), but Trust Co. may be subrogated to the prior lien of the Bank loan that its funds were used to
discharge. Subrogation in such circumstances will not be permitted to prejudice third parties, such
as subsequent lienors or creditors who rely on a misleading record title (§ 57(3))."); see also Rinn v.
First Union Nat'l. Bank of Md., 176 B.R. 401 (Bankr. D. Md. 1995). The subrogated claimant is, of
course, generally subject to any defenses that the primary obligor has against the third party lienor.
See R3RUE § 57 cmt. f.
290. See R3RUE § 66; see also id. § 66 cmt. a.
291. See id. § 57(3).
292. Gordon v. Novastar Mortg., Inc. (In re Hedrick), 524 F.3d 1175, 1182 (11th Cir. 2008),
amended by 529 F.3d 1026 (11 th Cir. 2008) (per curium).
293. United States v. Avila, 88 F.3d 229, 237-38 (3d Cir. 1996).
294. See, e.g., Gaines v. Ford Motor Credit Corp. (In re Gaines), 414 B.R. 494 (Bankr. E.D. Ark.
2009); Bank of N.Y. v. Leake (In re Wuerzberger), 284 BR. 814 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2009) (rejecting
trustee's claim for avoidance under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code); Agric. Servs., Inc. v.
Fitzgerald (In re Field), 263 B.R. 323 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2001) (rejecting trustee's claim for
avoidance under § 544(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code).
However, a series of cases from the bankruptcy courts of Vermont295 and at
least one other state296 have denied subrogation under circumstances clearly
within the scope of the R3RUE. These decisions limit subrogation to cases
of debtor misconduct rather than unjust enrichment generally, and elevate
the principle of pari passu over the principle of property without regard to
the law of equity. Equity's long-standing predisposition in favor of the
proprietary remedy of subrogation suggests that these courts misbalanced
matters.
VII. RESTITUTION (AND RESCISSION) IN CONTRACT LAW
A. From the Common Law
Restitution (sometimes paired with rescission) represents a remedy for
three distinct aspects of contract law.297 When describing a contracts
remedy, the term "restitution" is notoriously ambiguous. Moreover, the
circumstances wherein restitution is appropriately understood as a
proprietary remedy are cabined by significant limitations.298 A review of the
scope of restitution as a contractual remedy may be helpful. Following that
review is a consideration of the factors that the R3RUE deems relevant for
imposition of restitution as a proprietary remedy and why the R3RUE fails
to overcome the principle of pari passu in bankruptcy.299
1. As an Alternative to Expectation
The term "restitution" is commonly used to describe a monetary remedy
for breach of contract. 30 Restitution measures the damages of the aggrieved
party when it is unable to establish expectation damages and has no provable
reliance damages.30 ' Recovery of one's full expectation represents the goal
295. See, e.g., Bosley v. BAC Home Loan Servicing L.P.(In re Bosley), 446 B.R. 79 (Bankr. D.
Vt. 2011); In re Hutchins, 400 B.R. 403 (Bankr. D. Vt.), aff d sub nom. Tenn. Commerce Bank v.
Hutchins, 409 B.R. 680 (D. Vt. 2009). The bankruptcy court in Hutchins also held that Vermont's
motor vehicle title statue provided the exclusive means of perfecting a security interest in a motor
vehicle. Hutchins, 400 BR. at 410. Whether preemption is correct with respect to motor vehicles, it
is incorrect with respect to Article 9 in the First Circuit. See Nat'l Shawmut Bank of Bos. v. New
Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969).
296. See, e.g., Sheehan v. Valley Nat'l Bank (In re Shreves), 272 B.R. 614 (Bankr. N.D. W. Va.
2001).
297. These are as an alternative remedy to expectation damages, as a remedy for material breach,
and as a remedy for rescission. See infra Parts VII.A.I, VII.A.2, VII.A.4.
298. See infra Parts VII.A.1-4.
299. See infra Part VII.B.
300. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 371 (1981).
301. The alternative measures of contract damages are described in section 344 of the
Restatement (Second) Contracts. Id. § 344 ("Purposes Of Remedies: Judicial remedies under the
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of modem contract law. °2 Yet, even when proof of the benefit of the
bargain is impossible, the aggrieved party is entitled, at the least, to get back
her money (or the value of any other benefit conferred).303 The common law
has long recognized that parties aggrieved by a breach of contract who could
not prove the benefit of their bargain (the expectation measure of damages)
could nonetheless elect to recover damages measured by the value of what
the breacher had received. 0 4 In an effort to reduce ambiguity, section 38 of
the R3RUE describes this alternative measure of contract damages without
using the term "restitution:"
§ 38. Performance-Based Damages
(1) As an alternative to damages based on the expectation
interest (Restatement Second, Contracts § 347), a plaintiff who is
entitled to a remedy for material breach or repudiation may recover
rules stated in this Restatement serve to protect one or more of the following interests of a promisee:
(a) his 'expectation interest,' which is his interest in having the benefit of his bargain by being put in
as good a position as he would have been in had the contract been performed, (b) his 'reliance
interest,' which is his interest in being reimbursed for loss caused by reliance on the contract by
being put in as good a position as he would have been in had the contract not been made, or (c) his
'restitution interest,' which is his interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred
on the other party.").
302. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 1, intro, note ("The traditional
goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise
but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from breach."). For a discussion of contract
theory and contract remedies, see Pryor, supra note 27, at 724-32.
303. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 370 ("A party is entitled to restitution under
the rules stated in this Restatement only to the extent that he has conferred a benefit on the other
party by way of part performance or reliance."); see also U.C.C. § 2-711 ("Buyer's Remedies in
General; Buyer's Security Interest in Rejected Goods. (1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or
repudiates or the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance then with respect to any
goods involved, and with respect to the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 2-
612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has done so may in addition to recovering so much
of the price as has been paid."). This is commonly referred to as quantum meruit. See, e.g., Caton v.
Leach Corp., 896 F.2d 939, 947 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding that "quantum meruit... is founded upon a
theory of unjust enrichment, which 'characterizes the result of failure to make restitution of benefits
received .
304. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344 ("Judicial remedies ... serve to protect
one or more of the following interests of a promisee: ... (c) his 'restitution interest,' which is his
interest in having restored to him any benefit that he has conferred on the other party."); id. § 371
(measuring the restitution interest by either the market cost to the breacher of obtaining the benefits
received or the increase in value of the breacher's property as a result of performance by the
aggrieved party).
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damages measured by the cost or value of the plaintiff's
performance.S30
Although labeled restitution in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,
such a claim has never reflected anything more than an alternative measure
of contract damages and has never entailed a proprietary remedy.3°6
Regardless of the label for this measure of recovery, it is simply a measure
of contract damages and does not entail any of the proprietary remedies.S°7
In bankruptcy, the principle of pari passu trumps any lingering implications
of the principle of property when an aggrieved party simply elects
performance-based damages over the expectation measure. s30 In other
words, the claim of an aggrieved contract party is not enhanced by a
proprietary remedy simply because it cannot prove-or elects not to seek-
the value of its defeated expectation." 9
2. As a Remedy for Material Breach
Second, the contract law concept of material breach3"' (and
repudiation31 1) permits an aggrieved party not only to proceed against the
breacher for damages 31 2 but also to be freed from the obligation to carry out
305. Section 38 of the R3RUE goes on to provide clarity for measuring performance-based
damages:
(2) Performance-based damages are measured by
(a) uncompensated expenditures made in reasonable reliance on the contract,
including expenditures made in preparation for performance or in performance, less
any loss the defendant can prove with reasonable certainty the plaintiff would have
suffered had the contract been performed (Restatement Second, Contracts § 349); or
(b) the market value of the plaintiff's uncompensated contractual performance, not
exceeding the price of such performance as determined by reference to the parties'
agreement.
(3) A plaintiff whose damages are measured by the rules of subsection (2) may also
recover for any other loss, including incidental or consequential loss, caused by the
breach.
R3RUE § 38.
306. See id.
307. See id. § 38 cmt. a ("Though called 'restitution' it [the performance-based measure of
recovery] is simply an award of damages."). For a detailed comparison of the R3RUE and the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts at this point, see Joseph M. Perillo, Restitution in a Contractual
Context and the Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1007 (2011).
308. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
309. See R3RUE § 38.
310. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 241 (listing factors relevant to determining
whether breach was material).
311. See id. § 250.
312. Id. § 236 (uncured and unwavied material breach gives aggrieved party claim for damages
for total breach).
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its unperformed contract duties. 13 Discharge under the circumstances of a
material breach gives the aggrieved party the remedy which the common law
historically called rescission.314 The aggrieved party is entitled to full
compensation for the benefit of its bargain, 315 but because it is often difficult
to value the expectation interest after a material breach at an intermediate
stage of contract performance, the aggrieved party may seek restitution of
any benefit it has conferred on the breaching party.' 6  Paralleling the
alternative remedy of restitution for a simple breach of contract,317 section 37
of the R3RUE 31 1 specifies the availability of rescission and monetary
restitution for material breach. Like the aggrieved party's choice to pursue
performance-based damages for an ordinary breach of contract, the victim of
a material breach has the option to seek such damages.3"9 Given that
313. See id. § 237 (describing effect of material breach as failure of condition); id. § 225(2)
(providing that failure of condition discharges contractual obligations of aggrieved party). Contract
law does, however, recognize a limited duty to perform on the part of the aggrieved party when the
parties' reciprocal performances can be paired as "agreed equivalents." See id. § 240. See generally
JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 11.18(a) (6th ed. 2009).
314. See U.C.C. § 2-106(4) (2004) (cancellation as a remedy); id. § 2-608 ("Revocation of
Acceptance in Whole or in Part"). The Restatement (Second) of Contracts avoided the term
rescission but the drafters of the R3RUE have brought it back into the restatement lexicon. See, e.g.,
R3RUE §§ I cmt. c, 37(a).
315. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts calls this "damages for total breach." See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 243 ("Effect of a Breach by Non-Performance as Giving
Rise to a Claim for Damages for Total Breach"):
(1) With respect to performances to be exchanged under an exchange of promises, a
breach by non-performance gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach only if it
discharges the injured party's remaining duties to render such performance, other than a
duty to render an agreed equivalent under § 240.
316. See, e.g., U.S. v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1973); see also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) CONTRACTS § 373 ("Restitution When Other Party Is In Breach"):
(1) Subject to the rule stated in Subsection (2), on a breach by non-performance that gives
rise to a claim for damages for total breach or on a repudiation, the injured party is
entitled to restitution for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of
part performance or reliance.
317. See supra text accompanying notes 312-14.
318. R3RUE § 37 ("Rescission For Material Breach"); see infra Appendix A.
319. Id. A comment to section 37 of the R3RUE also notes that this will be a "relatively
uncommon remedy," presumably because even a short lapse of time generally makes it difficult to
unwind contractual performance. R3RUE § 37 cmit. a. Restitution for material breach or repudiation
also requires the claimant to restore anything it has received, which may further reduce its utility:
So long as it is possible as a practical matter to order that the plaintiff's performance be
restored in specie, it will usually be easier to do so than to calculate damages for breach
or to compel the defendant to complete the interrupted exchange .... A plaintiff who
would rather unwind a partly-completed exchange than force it ahead is given the
election to do so-though only when unwinding is a practical alternative.
ld.
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restitution for a material breach is merely a limited monetary remedy,
however, the principle of pari passu should control in insolvency
proceedings.
3. As the Result of Rescission
There is a third use of the term restitution in the realm of contracts, one
which the drafters of the R3RUE believe entails a proprietary remedy 2.3 1 It
is employed where the aggrieved party has a right to restitution of benefits
conferred on the other party after successfully exercising a power to avoid a
contract.3  In other words, restitution as a remedy for rescission of a "non-
contract." The power to avoid an otherwise formally valid contract typically
arises due to a defect in one of the contracting parties, as a result of a
defective process of contracting, 323 or because a contract is unenforceable for
a reason arising apart from the bargain itself.3 24  Elsewhere I have
characterized such grounds under the rubrics of the existential, the
situational, and the normative.3 2' The Restatement (Second) Contracts
explicitly acknowledges the remedy of restitution when a contract is
rescinded because of mistake3 26 or unenforceable because of the Statute of
Frauds. 27 On the other hand, it recognizes that restitution is generally not
available when public policy prohibits performance of a contract.
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320. See R3RUE ch. 4, Introductory Note, at 479 ("Claims of this kind are logically part of the
law of restitution, not contract, because they supply a remedy based on the defendant's unjust
enrichment in cases where contract law explicitly denies a claim.").
321. Id. Here too contract law creates ambiguity by using avoidance and rescission as virtual
synonyms.
322. The heading for a short series of specific grounds of avoidance is incapacity. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 12 ("Capacity To Contract").
323. In this area, courts have identified at least five specific grounds for avoidance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 152 (mutual mistake); id. § 153 (unilateral mistake); id.
§ 164 (misrepresentation); id. § 175 (duress); id. § 177 (undue influence).
324. Two grounds exemplify non-contractual reasons to bar enforcement of a bargain: the Statute
of Frauds and public policy. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 110 (Statute of
Frauds); id. § 178 (public policy). Section 31 of the R3RUE also includes contracts that fail for
indefiniteness in this category. R3RUE § 31 cmt. d.
325. See C. Scott Pryor, Consideration in the Common Law of Contracts: A Biblical-Theological
Critique, 18 REGENT U.L. REV. 1, 12-18 (2005).
326. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 158 ("Relief Including Restitution"):
(1) In any case governed by the rules stated in this Chapter, either party may have a claim
for relief including restitution under the rules stated in §§ 240 and 376.
327. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 375 ("Restitution When Contract Is Within
Statute of Frauds: A party who would otherwise have a claim in restitution under a contract is not
barred from restitution for the reason that the contract is unenforceable by him because of the Statute
of Frauds unless the Statute provides otherwise or its purpose would be frustrated by allowing
restitution.").
328. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 197 ("Restitution Generally Unavailable:
Except as stated in §§ 198 and 199, a party has no claim in restitution for performance that he has
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Restitution for other occasions of rescission is covered by the catch-all
provision of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.3 29
It is here-where restitution is the remedy for "non-contracts" -that the
potential for proprietary remedies is stronger. On the one hand, it is difficult
to conceptualize a place for the principle of property where restitution is
deployed simply as a remedy for breach of contract.330 The primacy of the
principle of pari passu in such situations is reinforced by the nature of the
risk assumed whenever contract is employed. The law presumes that
contract parties are routinely taking a risk that their counterparty will not
perform subject to the legal "backstop" of monetary damages.3 There is
little reason to afford an aggrieved contract party a proprietary remedy when
he has voluntarily assumed a risk of non-performance. But, on the other
hand, the same calculus does not obtain where there is no contract or, more
accurately, when a contract has been rescinded. The status of ownership of
property may well have characterized the position of one or both of the
parties before entering into the failed contract. If so, the R3RUE provides
for a presumption that it should continue (or resume) with respect to that
property after (or upon) avoidance.
4. As a Remedy for Rescission
The efforts of the drafters of the R3RUE to address the multifaceted
used of the term "restitution" in connection with all three aspects of contract
law explains the complexity of section 54 of the R3RUE 2 The length of
section 54 is double that of the rules for application of the other proprietary
remedies-constructive trust,333 equitable lien, 34 and subrogation.333
rendered under or in return for a promise that is unenforceable on grounds of public policy unless
denial of restitution would cause disproportionate forfeiture.").
329. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 376 ("Restitution when Contract is
Voidable: A party who has avoided a contract on the ground of lack of capacity, mistake,
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence or abuse of a fiduciary relation is entitled to restitution
for any benefit that he has conferred on the other party by way of part performance or reliance.").
330. See supra text accompanying notes 311-26.
331. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 16, topic 1 (discussing the
purposes of remedies in general).
332. R3RUE § 54 ("Rescission and Restitution"); see infra Appendix A.
333. See R3RUE § 55.
334. See id. § 56.
335. See id. § 57.
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The complexity of section 54 of the R3RUE speaks to its multiple
applications.336 Where a claimant is unable to prove the benefit of its
bargain, only fairness and judicial economy justify restitution of the benefits
provided to the defendant.337 The warrant for a proprietary remedy fails to
overcome the principle of pari passu when there is no substantive claim of
unjust enrichment.338 Additionally, even a breaching defendant may be
prejudiced when an aggrieved party seeks to rescind a subsisting contract
due to material breach and obtain restitution in lieu of expectation
damages.33 9 Thus, even in the context of the parties to the contract, breach
alone-even if material-does not entail a proprietary remedy in the face of
countervailing interests. It follows that the principle of pari passu will have
priority in an insolvency context. Notwithstanding a claimant's inability to
collect monetary damages due to the defendant's insolvency, the assumption
of the risk of non-performance inherent in contract minimizes the warrant
for a proprietary remedy34 -an assumption that forms the backdrop to the
baseline remedial provision of the Bankruptcy Code that address executory
contracts .
336. See id. § 54 cmt. b:
[T]he complex rules traditionally associated with the remedy of rescission and restitution
derive mostly from transactions in which (i) the parties are bound by a valid and
enforceable contract, (ii) the claimant prefers rescission to damages, yet (iii) rescission is
potentially prejudicial to the other party, costly in terms of judicial resources, or both.
337. See id. § 54 cmt. e:
[Wlhen rescission affords an alternative remedy for breach of a valid and enforceable
contract (as permitted by the rule of § 37)-a breach, in other words, that might be
remedied by damages or specific performance-the effect and the justification of the
rescission remedy are significantly different. Rescission in such a case permits the
injured party to make a fundamental election, choosing to go backward (to the status quo
ante) instead of forward (by enforcement of the contractual exchange) .... Unlike the
case of rescission for fraud or mistake, the justification of rescission as an alternative
remedy for breach is not the avoidance of unjust enrichment, but a concern with fairness
to the injured party combined with remedial economy.
338. See Andrew Kull, Rescission and Restitution, 61 Bus. LAW. 569, 576 (2006) ("Restitution
as a remedy for breach is not concerned with unjust enrichment.").
339. R3RUE § 54 cmt. c ("Rescission of a valid and enforceable contract overturns legitimate
contractual expectations on which both parties may have significantly relied."); see also Kull,
Rescission and Restitution, supra note 338, at 577 ("[I]f the contract calls for a complex and
inherently irreversible performance ... and if the parties have already performed for a number of
years, it is probably idle to think in terms of rescission -simply because it is impossible to
unscramble the egg.").
340. See R3RUE § 54 cmt. c ("Rescission as an alternative remedy for material breach-if
unrestricted by the requirement of counter-restitution -would thus give the plaintiff in effect an
option on the defendant's performance, rather than enforceable rights under a bilateral obligation.").
341. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2006):
Except as provided in subsections (h)(2) and (i)(2) of this section, the rejection of an
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor constitutes a breach of such contract
or lease-
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By contrast, where the substantive law of contracts permits avoidance of
the contract, assignment of the risk of non-performance to the claimant is not
as easily justified.342 Limiting the recovery of such a claimant by the
principle of pari passu is in tension with the power to rescind.343 A
proprietary remedy is appropriate where there is no subsisting contract and
the defendant has been unjustly enriched.3" Logically, the principle of
property might be deemed to protect the proprietary remedy even in the face
of the defendant's insolvency. However, even in situations where a contract
may be avoided, the voluntary nature of the claimant's circumstances
weakens the justification for a proprietary remedy.345 In other words, courts
treat parties to "non-contracts" as if they had assumed the risk of
nonperformance inherent in contracts generally when creditors of the
defendant would pay the price.346
But for the limited rights of reclamation under section 2-702 of the
Uniform Commercial Code,347 a seller who has sold goods on credit does not
(1) If such contract or lease has not been assumed ... immediately before the date
of the filing of the petition.
Other subsections of § 365 of the Bankruptcy Code provide special protections for certain aggrieved
non-debtor contract parties. I I U.S.C. § 365. None, however, provide a proprietary remedy for
avoidable contracts. Id.
342. See R3RUE § 54 cmt. c.
343. See id. § 54.
344. See id. (observing that section 54 of R3RUE liberalizes the requirement of counter-
restitution when the claimant's entry into a contract has been procured by fraud or mistake "because
the underlying exchange is ineffective to determine the parties' respective entitlements."); see also
id. § 54 cmt. d:
Rescission of defective agreements. When it extricates the claimant from a defective
agreement, rescission reverses a transfer that lacks an adequate legal basis and prevents
the unjustified enrichment that would otherwise result on either side. Concern for the
stability of the contractual exchange has no relevance to such a case, because there is no
valid exchange to protect. Specific restitution is required to the extent feasible ....
345. Cf. R3RUE § 54(4)(c) (denying restitution for rescission where "rights of innocent third
parties" would be "prejudiced"), with R3RUE § 66 (denying restitution in connection with other
proprietary remedies only if there is a subsequent purchaser for value); see also id. § 54 cmt. k:
[I]f a claimant were permitted to entertain for any significant period an election between
enforcement and avoidance-against a background of potentially fluctuating values-the
availability of rescission would give the claimant, in effect, an unpaid option on the
defendant's performance. ... The opportunistic use of rescission is barred, within
traditional doctrine, by a rule that a claimant seeking to rescind must give notice of the
election to do so with reasonable promptness after learning of the grounds for rescission.
346. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372 cmt. b (1981) ("A court may also refuse
specific restitution if it would otherwise cause injustice as where, for example, it would result in a
preference over other creditors in bankruptcy.").
347. U.C.C. § 2-702 (2011) ("Seller's Remedies on Discovery of Buyer's Insolvency"):
(1) Where the seller discovers the buyer to be insolvent he may refuse delivery except for
889
have the power to cancel a contract and reacquire transferred property upon
the buyer's insolvency.348 Even less does the common law of contracts
provide a restitutionary remedy on account of a contract party's
insolvency.349 Without the right of rescission, there cannot be a right of
specific restitution and, hence, no predicate for a proprietary remedy: there
has been no unjust enrichment.' The aggrieved contract party has a claim
in damages and may be able to suspend its performance35 1 but retains no
interest in specific property sold to the now-insolvent party. 2  In other
words, the common law lets the risk of insolvency fall to the solvent
counter-party, not the creditors of the debtor.
B. Into Bankruptcy
While the restitutionary measure of recovery resulting from rescission
has received limited recognition in bankruptcy, the proprietary remedy has
received none.353 As an example of the first situation, bankruptcy courts in
Ponzi-scheme cases have regularly recognized an offset measured by the
restitutionary interest.354 The typical scenario is an action by the trustee of
the now-bankrupt Ponzi scheme to recover payouts to investors as fraudulent
transfers under § 548 of the Bankruptcy Code.355 At least in the Ninth
cash including payment for all goods theretofore delivered under the contract, and stop
delivery under this Article (Section 2-705).
(2) Where the seller discovers that the buyer has received goods on credit while insolvent
he may reclaim the goods upon demand made within ten days after the receipt, but if
misrepresentation of solvency has been made to the particular seller in writing within
three months before delivery the ten day limitation does not apply. Except as provided in
this subsection the seller may not base a right to reclaim goods on the buyer's fraudulent
or innocent misrepresentation of solvency or of intent to pay.
(3) The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in
ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article (Section 2-403).
Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to them.
348. See R3RUE § 37(2) ("Rescission as a remedy for breach of contract is not available against
a defendant whose defaulted obligation is exclusively an obligation to pay money."). See generally
Knox v. Phoenix Leasing, Inc., 35 Cal. Rptr. 2d 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
349. The common law of contracts provides for specific restitution in limited circumstances. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372; see generally PERILLO, supra note 313, at § 15.5.
350. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 372.
351. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 252(1) ("Where the obligor's insolvency
gives the obligee reasonable grounds to believe that the obligor will commit a breach ... the obligee
may suspend any performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until he
receives assurance .... "). Contract parties can protect themselves by retaining or taking a security
interest to secure the obligor's duty of payment or performance. See U.C.C. § 9-201.
352. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 252 cmt. a.
353. See generally Duggan, supra note 66.
354. See, e.g., Soule v. Alliot (In re Tiger Petroleum Co.), 319 B.R. 225, 239 (Bankr. N.D. Okla.
2004).
355. See, e.g., Perkins v. Haines, 661 F.3d 623, 626-27 (11 th Cir. 2011).
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Circuit, the existence of a Ponzi scheme conclusively establishes that the
debtor made a transfer with "actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud" its
creditors 6 Thus, the trustee is entitled to recover all distributions from the
debtor to the scheme's transferees." 7 However, § 548(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides a defense to the extent that a good-faith transferee gave
"value" to the debtor.358  Bankruptcy courts have concluded that a
transferee's initial investment to the scheme may qualify as value.359
Because such an investment is typically induced by fraud, the transferee
could have rescinded it and would have been entitled to a claim for
restitution of the amount of the investment.3" Courts have concluded that
this restitution claim should be deemed to be "reasonably equivalent value"
for an equivalent portion of any distributions received from the scheme.36'
This analysis is consistent with the R3RUE. Section 13 of the R3RUE
justifies a claim of rescission to the extent of an innocent claimant's
investment in a Ponzi scheme.362 It also warrants restitution as a remedy.363
Conversely, claims of unjust enrichment against even innocent transferees
from a Ponzi scheme are authorized in section 58 of the R3RUE.364 In
addition, section 59 of the R3RUE provides that multiple restitution
claimants from an insolvent fraudster must share pro-rata to the extent of
their restitution claims.363 Sharing is a shortcut when restitution claims are
356. See, e.g., Hayes v. Palm Seedlings Partners-A (In re Agric. Research & Tech. Grp., Inc.),
916 F.2d 528,535 (9th Cir. 1990).
357. See, e.g., Donell v. Kowell, 533 F.3d 762,771 (9th Cir. 2008).
358. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2006):
(c) Except to the extent that a transfer or obligation voidable under this section is
voidable under section 544, 545, or 547 of this title, a transferee or obligee of such a
transfer or obligation that takes for value and in good faith has a lien on or may retain any
interest transferred or may enforce any obligation incurred, as the case may be, to the
extent that such transferee or obligee gave value to the debtor in exchange for such
transfer or obligation.
359. See Perkins, 661 F.3d at 627; see also Donnell, 533 F.3d at 772.
360. See, e.g., Barclay v. Mackenzie (In re AFI Holding, Inc.), 525 F.3d 700,708 (9th Cir. 2008).
361. Donell, 533 F.3d at 772 ("Payments up to the amount of the initial investment are considered
to be exchanged for 'reasonably equivalent value,' and thus not fraudulent, because they
proportionally reduce the investors' rights to restitution." (citation omitted)).
362. R3RUE § 13.
363. Id.
364. R3RUE § 58 ("(2) A claimant entitled to restitution from property or its traceable product
may assert the same rights against any subsequent transferee who is not a bona fide purchaser (§ 66)
or a bona fide payee (§ 67).").
365. Id. § 59 ("(4) If a fund contains the property of multiple restitution claimants (such as the
victims of successive fraud by the recipient): (a) Each claimant's interest in the fund and any product
thereof is determined by the proportion that such claimant's contributions bear to the balance of the
indistinguishable; however, the R3RUE provides a number of fine-grained
rules by which to distinguish among competing restitution claims. 66 In fact,
the R3RUE's principle-based rules can usefully supplement purely statutory
judicial analysis of complex Ponzi-scheme cases.367 The law of equity
provides a backdrop to the generalities of the Bankruptcy Code.
The fourth propriety remedy identified by the R3RUE-rescission and
restitution- arises from an avoidable contract.36 The absence of reported
bankruptcy cases recognizing restitution simply on account of the power to
avoid is telling. Despite its apparent breadth, section 54 of the R3RUE must
be coupled with something more, like a constructive trust, when third parties
are involved.369 With respect to creditors, a claimant must establish an
independent ground for rescission,37 ° the right of restitution vis-A-vis the
defendant, and that the creditors would be unjustly enriched. Moreover, a
claimant must convince the court that it could not have employed a security
device to recover property when it seeks to reverse a transfer of property
over the objections of the defendant's creditors.37'
While section 2-702 of the Uniform Commercial Code 372 authorizes a
limited right of reclamation of goods sold to an insolvent buyer, in
bankruptcy such restitutionary claims have been uncritically treated as debts
and not as proprietary interests .3" The failure of bankruptcy courts or
fund upon each contribution and withdrawal, but only if the accounting necessary to this calculation
can be established without using the presumptions or marshaling rules of § 59(2). (b) If the evidence
does not permit the court to distinguish the interests of multiple restitution claimants by reference to
actual transactions, such claimants recover ratably from the fund and any product thereof in
proportion to their respective losses.").
366. See id. § 59 cmt. g ("Granting the obvious equity of treating like cases alike, it is important
to recognize the many ways in which claimants who are similarly situated-insofar as they are
equally innocent victims of equivalent wrongdoing-may nevertheless obtain widely different relief
in restitution. The law of unjust enrichment does not impose a rule of contribution or loss-sharing
between the victims of common or related injuries, and individual outcomes will frequently depend
on the circumstances that determine whether a particular claimant's assets (or their traceable
product) may be identified in the property available for distribution.").
367. See Andrew Kull, Common-Law Restitution and the Madoff Liquidation, 92 B.U. L. REV.
939 (2012); see generally Mallory A. Sullivan, Note, When the Bezzle Bursts: Restitutionary
Distribution of Assets After Ponzi Schemes Enter Bankruptcy, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1589, 1601-
10 (2011) (describing fictions used to trace Ponzi-scheme assets claimed by creditors and
circumstances justifying suspension of those fictions in favor of pro rata distributions).
368. See supra text accompanying notes 341-54.
369. See R3RUE § 54 cmt. a ("[A] claimant who seeks to reacquire an asset in priority to the
defendant's creditor will usually ask the court to decree a rescission in conjunction with some further
remedy such as constructive trust.").
370. See id.
371. R3RUE § 54 cmt. a ("Even if the defendant's breach involves something beyond a failure to
pay money, a court will refuse to grant the claimant a retroactive priority-to the prejudice of third
parties-that might have been acquired by contract, employing the ordinary modes of security.").
372. See supra note 347.
373. See, e.g., Wyle v. C.H. Rider & Family (In re United Energy Corp.), 944 F.2d 589, 595 (9th
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apparently even parties to consider the possibility of the proprietary remedy
of rescission and restitution speaks to a point made earlier: restitution, even
on account of an avoidable contract, is simply an alternative to promote
judicial efficiency.374 The close nexus between the right of rescission and
contract warrants subordinating this equitable principle of property to the
principle of pari passu.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The R3RUE is not the law of equity; however, it will go far to clarify
the law of equity in many states. Cases addressing the predicates of unjust
enrichment and its remedies are generally old and often their presuppositions
are unexplained. The decline of formal study of equity has left most judges
and practicing lawyers without knowledge of what constitutes unjust
enrichment. The R3RUE makes that nearly lost body of knowledge
accessible. Sooner or later the effects of this clarification will be observed
in bankruptcy jurisprudence.
The moralistic cast of decisions in equity from the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries jars the modern ear. Reconceptualization of unjust
enrichment as unjustified enrichment- and the provision of reasonably clear
rules to identify when it exists-will allay the contemporary fear of overt
morality in the private law sphere. 75 The R3RUE will make assertions that
equity's proprietary interests are "mere remedies" untenable.
The four proprietary remedies for unjust enrichment are clarified in the
R3RUE. More importantly, and with the exception of rescission and
restitution, the R3RUE states a cogent basis for three of the proprietary
remedies in bankruptcy; it also provides a clear rule for tracing and a well-
defined statement of defenses. Equally with the common law's recognition
of legal interests in property, the law of equity warrants recognition of the
principle of property. The countervailing bankruptcy principle of pari passu
should not, without evidence of clear congressional intent to the contrary,
simply be assumed to have priority.376
Cir. 1991) (discussing meaning of "antecedent debt" as defense to fraudulent conveyance claim).
374. See supra text accompanying notes 346-49.
375. One might argue that the contemporary phobia of morality is exaggerated. As James Rogers
puts it, "Perhaps part of the reason that the law of restitution can get away with expressing its basic
concept in such starkly moralistic language is a fairly simple point. The basic principle of the law of
restitution is simple." See Rogers, supra note 3, at 1393-94.
376. See Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410,419 (1992) ("When Congress amends the bankruptcy
laws, it does not write 'on a clean slate."').
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Of the four proprietary remedies, reconfiguration of constructive trust
should have the greatest impact in bankruptcy. The judicial penchant of
characterizing constructive trust as a "mere" remedy should be eliminated.
Courts should jettison rhetorical flourishes suggesting that constructive trust
is inconsistent with the policy of bankruptcy. Equitable liens and
subrogation should find themselves on firmer analytical footing, and
precedent avoiding any of the proprietary remedies should be reconsidered.
Notwithstanding the R3RUE, however, bankruptcy courts are unlikely to
recognize the paired set of rescission and restitution as creating a proprietary
remedy. The nexus of the pair to contract, with contract's inherent element
of risk, will continue to warrant priority for the principle of pari passu.
While the law of equity remains a living part of state common law
jurisprudence, contemporary American bankruptcy law and practice threaten
to submerge equity's proprietary remedies in a pool of ignorance. If nothing
else, the R3RUE will provide a rope for equity's rescue.
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IX. APPENDIX A-SELECTED PROVISIONS OF THE RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
R3RUE § 4. Restitution May Be Legal or Equitable or Both
(1) Liabilities and remedies within the law of restitution and unjust
enrichment may have originated in law, in equity, or in a
combination of the two.
(2) A claimant otherwise entitled to a remedy for unjust enrichment,
including a remedy originating in equity, need not demonstrate the
inadequacy of available remedies at law.
R3RUE § 5. Invalidating Mistake
(1) A transfer induced by invalidating mistake is subject to
rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution as
necessary to avoid unjust enrichment. Particular instances of
restitution for mistake are described in §§ 6-12 and 34.
(2) An invalidating mistake may be a misapprehension of either fact
or law. There is invalidating mistake only when
(a) but for the mistake the transaction in question would not
have taken place; and
(b) the claimant does not bear the risk of the mistake.
(3) A claimant bears the risk of a mistake when
(a) the risk is allocated to the claimant by agreement of the
parties;
(b) the claimant has consciously assumed the risk by deciding
to act in the face of a recognized uncertainty; or
(c) allocation to the claimant of the risk in question accords
with the common understanding of the transaction concerned.
(4) A claimant does not bear the risk of a mistake merely because
the mistake results from the claimant's negligence.
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R3RUE § 7. Mistaken Performance of Another's Obligation
Mistaken performance of another's obligation gives the performing
party a claim in restitution against the obligor to the extent of the
benefit mistakenly conferred on the obligor.
R3RUE § 8. Mistaken Discharge of Obligation or Lien
(1) Mistaken discharge by an obligee of an obligation or the security
therefor [sic] gives the obligee a claim in restitution by
reinstatement of the rights mistakenly surrendered.
(2) If the use of the claimant's funds to discharge a lien confers an
unintended benefit on another person as the result of the claimant's
mistake about title to the encumbered property, the existence of
intervening liens, or other relevant circumstances, the claimant is
entitled to restitution via subrogation to the discharged lien
(§ ° 57(l)(a)) as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
R3RUE § 13. Fraud and Misrepresentation
(1) A transfer induced by fraud or material misrepresentation is
subject to rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in
restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
(2) A transfer induced by fraud is void if the transferor had neither
knowledge of, nor reasonable opportunity to learn, the character of
the resulting transfer or its essential terms. Otherwise the transferee
obtains voidable title.
R3RUE § 14. Duress
(1) Duress is coercion that is wrongful as a matter of law.
(2) A transfer induced by duress is subject to rescission and
restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution as necessary to
avoid unjust enrichment.
(3) If the effect of duress is tantamount to physical compulsion, a
transfer induced by duress is void. If not, a transfer induced by
duress conveys voidable title.
R3RUE § 15. Undue Influence
(1) Undue influence is excessive and unfair persuasion, sufficient to
overcome the free will of the transferor, between parties who
896
[Vol. 40: 843, 2013] Third Time's the Charm
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
occupy either a confidential relation or a relation of dominance on
one side and subservience on the other.
(2) A transfer induced by undue influence is subject to rescission
and restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution as necessary to
avoid unjust enrichment.
R3RUE § 16. Incapacity of Transferor
(1) A transfer by a person lacking requisite legal capacity is subject
to rescission and restitution unless ratified. The transferee is liable
in restitution as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
(2) Except as otherwise provided by statute:
(a) A transfer by a minor confers voidable title.
(b) When a transfer is challenged on the ground of mental
capacity:
(i) if at the time of the transfer the transferor's incapacity
has been adjudicated and is continuing, the transfer is void;
(ii) if the transferor's incapacity is only adjudicated
thereafter, the transfer confers voidable title.
(c) When a transfer is challenged on the ground that a transferor
such as a municipal corporation or government agency has
acted outside the scope of its statutory authority:
(i) a transfer wholly beyond the powers of the transferor is
void;
(ii) a transfer which is potentially within the scope of the
transferor's powers, but which is invalid for defective
authorization or execution, confers voidable title.
(3) If the transferee has dealt with the transferor in good faith on
reasonable terms, then notwithstanding the transferor's incapacity
(a) rescission and restitution leaves the transferor liable in
restitution for benefits received in the transaction, as provided
in §§ 33 and 54; and
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(b) the court may qualify or deny the right to rescission to avoid
an inequitable result (§ - 54(6)).
R3RUE § 17. Lack of Authority
A transfer by an agent, trustee, or other fiduciary outside the scope
of the transferor's authority, or otherwise in breach of the
transferor's duty to the principal or beneficiary, is subject to
rescission and restitution. The transferee is liable in restitution to
the principal or beneficiary as necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
R3RUE § 20. Protection of Another's Life or Health
(1) A person who performs, supplies, or obtains professional
services required for the protection of another's life or health is
entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision to intervene
without request.
(2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by a
reasonable charge for the services in question.
R3RUE § 21. Protection of Another's Property
(1) A person who takes effective action to protect another's
property from threatened harm is entitled to restitution from the
other as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, if the
circumstances justify the decision to intervene without request.
Unrequested intervention is justified only when it is reasonable to
assume the owner would wish the action performed.
(2) Unjust enrichment under this section is measured by the loss
avoided or by a reasonable charge for the services provided,
whichever is less.
R3RUE § 22. Performance of Another's Duty
(1) A person who performs another's duty to a third person or to the
public is entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment, if the circumstances justify the decision
to intervene without request.
(2) Unrequested intervention may be justified in the following
circumstances:
(a) the claimant may be justified in paying another's money
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debt if there is no prejudice to the obligor in substituting a
liability in restitution for the original obligation;
(b) the claimant may be justified in performing another's duty
to furnish necessaries to a third person, to avoid imminent harm
to the interests of the third person; and
(c) the claimant may be justified in performing another's duty
to the public, if performance is urgently required for the
protection of public health, safety, or general welfare.
(3) There is no unjust enrichment and no claim in restitution by the
rule of this section except insofar as the claimant's intervention has
relieved the defendant of an otherwise enforceable obligation.
R3RUE § 23. Performance of a Joint Obligation (Indemnity and
Contribution)
(1) If the claimant renders to a third person a performance for which
claimant and defendant are jointly and severally liable, the claimant
is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment.
(2) There is unjust enrichment in such a case to the extent that
(a) the effect of the claimant's intervention is to reduce an
enforceable obligation of the defendant to the third person, and
(b) as between the claimant and the defendant, the obligation
discharged (or the part thereof for which the claimant seeks
restitution) was primarily the responsibility of the defendant.
R3RUE § 24. Performance of an Independent Obligation (Equitable
Subrogation)
(1) If the claimant renders to a third person a performance for which
the defendant would have been independently liable to the third
person, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
(2) There is unjust enrichment in such a case to the extent that
(a) the claimant acts in the performance of the claimant's
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independent obligation to the third person, or otherwise in the
reasonable protection of the claimant's own interests; and
(b) as between the claimant and the defendant, the performance
in question (or the part thereof for which the claimant seeks
restitution) is primarily the obligation of the defendant.
R3RUE § 26. Protection of Claimant's Property
If the claimant incurs necessary expense to protect an interest in
property and in so doing confers an economic benefit on another
person in consequence of the other's interest in the same property,
the claimant is entitled to restitution from the other as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment.
R3RUE § 28. Unmarried Cohabitants
(1) If two persons have formerly lived together in a relationship
resembling marriage, and if one of them owns a specific asset to
which the other has made substantial, uncompensated contributions
in the form of property or services, the person making such
contributions has a claim in restitution against the owner as
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment upon the dissolution of the
relationship.
(2) The rule of subsection (1) may be displaced, modified, or
supplemented by local domestic relations law.
R3RUE § 31. Unenforceability
(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement that
cannot be enforced against the recipient by reason of
(a) indefiniteness, or
(b) the failure to satisfy an extrinsic requirement of
enforceability such as the Statute of Frauds,
has a claim in restitution against the recipient as necessary to
prevent unjust enrichment. There is no unjust enrichment if the
claimant receives the counterperformance specified by the parties'
unenforceable agreement.
(2) There is no claim under this section if enforcement of the
agreement is barred by the applicable statute of limitations, nor in
any other case in which the allowance of restitution would defeat
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the policy of the law that makes the agreement unenforceable.
Restitution is appropriate except to the extent that forfeiture is an
intended or acceptable consequence of unenforceability.
R3RUE § 32. Illegality
A person who renders performance under an agreement that is
illegal or otherwise unenforceable for reasons of public policy may
obtain restitution from the recipient in accordance with the
following rules:
(1) Restitution will be allowed, whether or not necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment, if restitution is required by the policy of the
underlying prohibition.
(2) Restitution will also be allowed, as necessary to prevent unjust
enrichment, if the allowance of restitution will not defeat or
frustrate the policy of the underlying prohibition. There is no unjust
enrichment if the claimant receives the counterperformance
specified by the parties' unenforceable agreement.
(3) Restitution will be denied, notwithstanding the enrichment of
the defendant at the claimant's expense, if a claim under subsection
(2) is foreclosed by the claimant's inequitable conduct (§ 63).
R3RUE § 33. Incapacity of Recipient
(1) A person who renders performance under an agreement that is
unenforceable by reason of the other party's legal incapacity has a
claim in restitution against the recipient as necessary to prevent
unjust enrichment. There is no unjust enrichment if the claimant
receives the counterperformance specified by the parties'
unenforceable agreement.
(2) Restitution under this section is available only to a person who
has dealt with the recipient in good faith on reasonable terms.
(3) Notwithstanding the unjust enrichment of the recipient,
restitution may be limited or denied if it would be inconsistent with
the protection that the doctrine of incapacity is intended to afford in
the circumstances of the case.
R3RUE § 34. Mistake or Supervening Change of Circumstances
(1) A person who renders performance under a contract that is
subject to avoidance by reason of mistake or supervening change of
circumstances has a claim in restitution to recover the performance
or its value, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment. If the case is
one in which the requirements of § 54 can be met, the remedy of
rescission and restitution permits the reversal of the transaction
without the need to demonstrate unjust enrichment.
(2) For purposes of subsection (1):
(a) the value of a nonreturnable contractual performance is
measured by reference to the recipient's contractual
expectations; and
(b) the recipient's liability in restitution may be reduced to
allow for loss incurred in reliance on the contract.
R3RUE § 36. Restitution to a Party in Default
(1) A performing party whose material breach prevents a recovery
on the contract has a claim in restitution against the recipient of
performance, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
(2) Enrichment from receipt of an incomplete or defective
contractual performance is measured by comparison to the
recipient's position had the contract been fully performed. The
claimant has the burden of establishing the fact and amount of any
net benefit conferred.
(3) A claim under this section may be displaced by a valid
agreement of the parties establishing their rights and remedies in the
event of default.
(4) If the claimant's default involves fraud or other inequitable
conduct, restitution may on that account be denied (§ 63).
R3RUE § 37. Rescission for Material Breach
(1) Except as provided in subsection (2), a plaintiff who is entitled
to a remedy for the defendant's material breach or repudiation may
choose rescission as an alternative to enforcement if the further
requirements of § 54 can be met.
(2) Rescission as a remedy for breach of contract is not available
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against a defendant whose defaulted obligation is exclusively an
obligation to pay money.
R3RUE § 40. Trespass, Conversion, and Comparable Wrongs
A person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or conversion,
by comparable interference with other protected interests in tangible
property, or in consequence of such an act by another, is liable in
restitution to the victim of the wrong.
R3RUE § 41. Misappropriation of Financial Assets
A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriating financial assets,
or in consequence of their misappropriation by another, is liable in
restitution to the victim of the wrong.
R3RUE § 42. Interference with Intellectual Property and Similar Rights
A person who obtains a benefit by misappropriation or infringement
of another's legally protected rights in any idea, expression,
information, image, or designation is liable in restitution to the
holder of such rights.
R3RUE § 43. Fiduciary or Confidential Relation
A person who obtains a benefit
(a) in breach of a fiduciary duty,
(b) in breach of an equivalent duty imposed by a relation of trust
and confidence, or
(c) in consequence of another's breach of such a duty,
is liable in restitution to the person to whom the duty is owed.
R3RUE § 48. Payment to Defendant to Which Claimant Has a Better Right
If a third person makes a payment to the defendant to which (as
between claimant and defendant) the claimant has a better legal or
equitable right, the claimant is entitled to restitution from the
defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.
R3RUE § 50. Innocent Recipient
(1) An "innocent recipient" is one who commits no misconduct in
the transaction concerned (§ 51) and who bears no responsibility for
the unjust enrichment in question (§ 52).
(2) If nonreturnable benefits would be susceptible of different
valuations by the standards identified in § 49(3), the liability of an
innocent recipient is determined as follows:
(a) Unjust enrichment from unrequested benefits is measured
by the standard that yields the smallest liability in restitution.
(b) Unjust enrichment from requested benefits is measured by
their reasonable value to the recipient. Reasonable value is
normally the lesser of market value and a price the recipient has
expressed a willingness to pay.
(c) Reasonable value may be measured by a more restrictive
standard if the validity of the recipient's assent is in question (§
49(3)(d)); if the claimant has not performed as requested (§ 36);
or if prevailing prices include an element of profit that the court
decides to withhold from the claimant.
(3) The liability in restitution of an innocent recipient of
unrequested benefits may not leave the recipient worse off (apart
from the costs of litigation) than if the transaction giving rise to the
liability had not occurred.
(4) The liability in restitution of an innocent recipient of
unrequested benefits may not exceed the cost to the claimant of
conferring the benefits in question, supplemented when appropriate
by the rules of § 53.
(5) An innocent recipient may be liable in an appropriate case for
use value or proceeds, but not for consequential gains (§ 53).
R3RUE § 54. Rescission and Restitution
(1) A person who has transferred money or other property is entitled
to recover it by rescission and restitution if
(a) the transaction is invalid or subject to avoidance for a reason
identified in another section of this Restatement, and
(b) the further requirements of this section may be satisfied.
(2) Rescission requires a mutual restoration and accounting in
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which each party
(a) restores property received from the other, to the extent such
restoration is feasible,
(b) accounts for additional benefits obtained at the expense of
the other as a result of the transaction and its subsequent
avoidance, as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment, and
(c) compensates the other for loss from related expenditure as
justice may require.
(3) Rescission is limited to cases in which counter-restitution by the
claimant will restore the defendant to the status quo ante, unless
(a) the defendant is fairly compensated for any deficiencies in
the restoration made by the claimant, or
(b) the fault of the defendant or the assignment of risks in the
underlying transaction makes it equitable that the defendant
bear any uncompensated loss.
(4) Rescission is appropriate when the interests of justice are served
by allowing the claimant to reverse the challenged transaction
instead of enforcing it. As a general rule:
(a) If the claimant seeks to reverse a transfer induced by fraud
or other conscious wrongdoing, the limitation described in
subsection (3) is liberally construed in favor of the claimant.
(b) If the claimant seeks rescission instead of damages as a
remedy for material breach of contract (§ 37), the limitation
described in subsection (3) is employed to prevent injustice to
the defendant from the reversal of a valid and enforceable
exchange.
(c) If rescission would prejudice intervening rights of innocent
third parties, the remedy will on that account be denied.
(5) Restitution or a tender of restitution by the claimant is not a
prerequisite of rescission if affirmative relief to the claimant can be
reduced by (or made subject to) the claimant's reciprocal obligation
of restitution.
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(6) Prejudicial or speculative delay by the claimant in asserting a
right of rescission, or a change of circumstances unfairly prejudicial
to the defendant, justifies denial of the remedy.
R3RUE § 55. Constructive Trust
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by the acquisition of title to
identifiable property at the expense of the claimant or in violation of
the claimant's rights, the defendant may be declared a constructive
trustee, for the benefit of the claimant, of the property in question
and its traceable product.
(2) The obligation of a constructive trustee is to surrender the
constructive trust property to the claimant, on such conditions as the
court may direct.
R3RUE § 56. Equitable Lien
(1) If a defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which
(a) the claimant's assets or services are applied to enhance or
preserve the value of particular property to which the defendant
has legal title, or more generally
(b) the connection between unjust enrichment and the
defendant's ownership of particular property makes it equitable
that the claimant have recourse to that property for the
satisfaction of the defendant's liability in restitution,
the claimant may be granted an equitable lien on the property in
question.
(2) An equitable lien secures the obligation of the defendant to pay
the claimant the amount of the defendant's unjust enrichment as
separately determined. Foreclosure of an equitable lien is subject to
such conditions as the court may direct.
(3) A claimant who would be entitled to ownership of particular
property via constructive trust (§ 55) may elect to obtain an
equitable lien on the property instead.
(4) The remedy of equitable lien is also a means to restrict the
claimant's recovery, in cases where restitution via personal liability
or constructive trust would exceed limits set by § 50 or § 61.
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R3RUE § 57. Subrogation as a Remedy
(1) If the defendant is unjustly enriched by a transaction in which
property of the claimant is used to discharge an obligation of the
defendant or a lien on the defendant's property, the claimant may
obtain restitution
(a) by succeeding to the rights of the obligee or lienor against
the defendant or the defendant's property, as though such
discharge had not occurred, and
(b) by succeeding to the collateral rights of the defendant in the
transaction concerned.
(2) Recovery via subrogation may not exceed reimbursement to the
claimant.
(3) The remedy of subrogation may be qualified or withheld when
necessary to avoid an inequitable result in the circumstances of a
particular case.
R3RUTE § 59. Tracing into or Through a Commingled Fund
(1) If property of the claimant is deposited in a common account or
otherwise commingled with other property so that it is no longer
separately identifiable, the traceable product of the claimant's
property may be identified in
(a) the balance of the commingled fund or a portion thereof, or
(b) property acquired with withdrawals from the commingled
fund, or a portion thereof, or
(c) a combination of the foregoing,
in accordance with the further rules stated in this section.
(2) If property of the claimant has been commingled by a recipient
who is a conscious wrongdoer or a defaulting fiduciary (§ 51) or
equally at fault in dealing with the claimant's property (§ 52):
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(a) Withdrawals that yield a traceable product and withdrawals
that are dissipated are marshaled so far as possible in favor of
the claimant.
(b) Subsequent contributions by the recipient do not restore
property previously misappropriated from the claimant, unless
the recipient affirmatively intends such application.
(c) After one or more withdrawals from a commingled fund, the
portion of the remainder that may be identified as the traceable
product of the claimant's property may not exceed the fund's
lowest intermediate balance.
(3) If property of the claimant has been commingled by an innocent
recipient (§ 50), the claimant's property may be traced into the
remaining balance of the commingled fund and any product thereof
in the manner permitted by § 59(2), but restitution from property so
identified may not exceed the amount for which the recipient is
liable by the rules of §§ 50 and 53.
R3RUE § 60. Priority
(1) Except as otherwise provided by statute and by § 61, a right to
restitution from identifiable property is superior to the competing
rights of a creditor of the recipient who is not a bona fide purchaser
or payee of the property in question. Acquisition of a judicial lien
(by attachment, garnishment, judgment, execution, or the like) does
not make the lien creditor a purchaser of the property subject to lien.
(2) Priority between a restitution claimant and a third-party
purchaser or payee is determined by the rules of §§ 66-67.
(3) A claimant who is entitled to restitution but who is unable to
identify specific property from which restitution is available has a
remedy via money judgment that ranks equally with the claims of
general creditors.
R3RUE § 63. Equitable Disqualification (Unclean Hands)
Recovery in restitution to which an innocent claimant would be
entitled may be limited or denied because of the claimant's
inequitable conduct in the transaction that is the source of the
asserted liability.
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R3RUE § 66. Bona Fide Purchaser
A purchaser for value and without notice acquires the legal interest
that the grantor holds and purports to convey, free of equitable
interests that a restitution claimant might have asserted against the
property in the hands of the grantor.
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